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"Dealing with the Appellate Caseload 
Crisis": The Report of the Federal Courts 
Study Committee Revisited 
57 N.Y.L. Sett. L. REv. 517 (2012-2013) 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The majority of this 
article was written by Judge Miner before he passed away on February 18, 2012. The remainder was completed 
by Judge Miner's Law Clerks, Alicia Surdyk and M?-tthew]. Zappen, with the assistance of Judge Miner's 
Judicial Assistant Shirley Hicks, based on the Judge's comprehensive notes and annotated research and also on the 
clerks' extensive conversations with the Judge prior to his passing. This article is published posthumously in his 
memory and represents the last in a long list of publications by Judge Miner, many dealing with judicial 
administration and the "appellate casdoad crisis." See, e.g., Roger J. Miner, Federal Court Reform Should Start at the 
Top, 77 JUDICATURE 104 (1993); Roger J. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the Federal Courts, 43 SYRACUSE L. 
REv. 681 {1992); Roger J. Miner, Consequences if Federalizing Criminal Law, 3 CRIM. JusT. 16 (1989); Roger J. 
Miner, Federal Courts at the Crossroads, 4 CoNST. COMMENT. 251 {1987); Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal 
Crimes, ~nd Federalism, 10 HARV. J. L. & PuB. Por,'y 117 {1989); Roger J. Miner, Research in]udicialAdministratirm: 
A Judge's Perspective, 12 JusT. SvsT. J. 8 (1987); see also Roger J. Miner, Book Rroiew, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 1189 
(1997) (reviewing RICHARD A. PosNER, THE FEDERAL CouRTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM (1996)). 
EDITOR'S NOTE: The New York Law School Law Review is pleased to publish this article in memory of The 
Honorable Roger J. Miner '56 and his many contributions to the law, the legal profession, the federal judiciary, 
and New York Law School. As a student at New York Law School, Judge Miner served on the Law Review in 
1955 (then published as the New York Law Forum) and served as its first Managing Editor. He was always very 
proud of this accomplishment and in subsequent years was one of the Law Review's greatest supporters. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Courts Study Committee (the "Committee"), created by an act of 
Congress in 1988, was charged with inquiring into the issues and problems 
confronting the federal courts of the nation and developing a long-range plan for the 
future of the federal judiciary.1 In its Final Report, issued on April 2, 1990, the 
Committee recognized the need to respond "to mounting public and professional 
concern with the federal courts' congestion, delay, expense, and expansion."2 The 
Committee clearly identified the burgeoning volume of appeals as a major factor 
underlying this concern. Accordingly, the Final Report included a chapter entitled 
Dealing with the Appellate Caseload Crisis. This portion of the Final Report responded 
to the unprecedented volume of litigation the federal courts of appeals were then 
confronting. 3 The chapter began as follows: 
However people may view other aspects of the Federal Judiciary, few deny 
that its appellate courts are in a "crisis of volume" that has transformed them 
from the institutions they were even a generation ago. Further and more 
fundamental change to the appellate courts would seem to be inevitable 
unless there is a halt to the climb in appellate workload. While it is impossible 
to read the future, we see little reason to anticipate such a halt. 4 
In this article, I revisit the Committee's Final Report and describe how the "crisis 
of volume" has endured and intensified; analyze various causes giving rise to the 
crisis; review some of its consequences; evaluate the Committee's study; discuss the 
inadequacy of methods presently employed to deal with the proliferation of appeals; 
and, finally, propose the adoption, in part, of a method considered and rejected by 
the Committee for dealing with the appellate caseload crisis. 
II. DESCRIBING THE CRISIS, THEN AND NOW 
Over twenty years ago, the Committee made the following observations in 
regard to the intensifying increase in appellate caseloads and in the workloads of 
individual judges: 
In 1945, litigants appealed about one of every forty district court terminations; 
they now appeal about one in eight. As a result, appellate filings have risen 
nearly fifteen-fold. (As we note in the Overview, they have increased by ten-
fold since 1958.) The number of appellate judges, however, has increased 
since 1945 by a factor of less than three, from 59 to 168. Consequently, the 
caseload per judge has multiplied by nearly six over the same period. Circuit 
judges of the 1940s and 1950s would find today's caseloads unmanageable. 
1. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
2. THE FED. COURTS STUDY CoMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 3 {1990) 
[hereinafter F1NAL REPORT], available at www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/repfcsc.pdf/$file/repfcsc. 
pd£ 
3. Id. at 109~31. 
4. Id. at 109. 
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Even in 1965, each appellate judge, sitting in panels of three, participated in 
an average of 136 terminations after hearing or submission. By 1989, that 
number had almost tripled, to 372 per judge. In all but tvvo circuits it exceeds 
255, which is the Judicial Conference standard for an appellate judge's annual 
workload. In the five busiest circuits, the range is from 411 to 525. The 255 
participation standard, furthermore, is too high according to most judges 
who responded to the committee's survey.5 
There has been a major expansion in the "appellate caseload explosion," as 
described by the Committee, 6 and the crisis of volume is now much more acute than 
when the Committee's Final Report was written. In 1990, 40,898 appeals were filed.' 
Eighteen years later, the number of filings for the twelve-month period ending 
September 30, 2008, reached 61,104 (an increase of 49.41%). 8 For that year, there were 
448 terminations on the merits and 156 procedural terminations per active judge 
nationally.' From the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2008, to the twelve-
month period ending September 30, 2011, total filings declined 9.7%, from 61,104 to 
55,126; however, the terminations per active judge rose during the same period to 456 
terminations on the merits (an increase of 1.79%) and 151 procedural terminations (a 
decrease of 3.2o/o) on a national basis.10 The 255 participations per active judge, 
considered the standard in 1990, has long since, and remains to be, surpassed. The 
increase in the number of active judges from 168 twenty years ago to 179 today 
obviously has done nothing to stem the tide of individual judicial caseloads." 
An overwhelming percentage of appeals are found to be without merit. For the 
twelve-month period ending September 30, 2011, of the 57,357 total appeals that 
5. Id. at 110. 
6. See AoMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL CouRT MANAGEMENT STATtST1cs 2010: U.S. 
CouRTS OF APPEALS-JunICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE (2010) [hereinafter FEDERAL CouRT 
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 2010], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa2010Sep.pl (select 
"National Totals" from drop-down menu then click "Generate"); Filings in the Federal judiciary 
Continued to Grow in Fiscal Year 2010, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTS (Mar. 2011), http://www. 
uscourts. gov/News/The ThirdBranch/11-03-01/Filings _in_ the _F ederalJ udiciary _Continued_ to_ 
Grow_in_Fiscal_Year_2010.aspx. 
7. ADM IN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ]UDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES 52 (1990), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/ 
Proceedings/Proceedings.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/judconf/proceedings/1990-09.pdf. 
8. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE lJ.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 2008: U.S. COURTS 
OF APPEALS-JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer. 
aspx?doc=lcgi-bin/cmsa2008.pl (select "National Totals" from drop-down menu then click "Generate"). 
9. Id. 
l 0. AnMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTS, FEDERAL CouRT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 2011: U.S. CouRTS 
OF APPEALS-JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE (2011) [hereinafter FEDERAL CouRT MANAGEMENT 
STATISTICS 2011], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/ 
Courts0fAppealsSep2011.aspx (select "National Totals" from drop-down menu then click "Generate"). 
11. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 110; see also Inside the Federal Courts, Ji.ow the Federal Courts Are 
Organized, Federal judges and How They Get Appointed, FED. Juo1ClARY CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/ 
federal/courts.nsf (follow "How the Federal Courts Are Organized" hyperlink; then follow "Federal 
judges and how they get appointed" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
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were terminated for all circuits, 30,290 (or 52.8%) were terminated on the merits.12 Of 
those terminated on the merits, 23,998 (or 79.2%) were affirmed/enforced (including 
appeals reversed in part); 3019 (or 10%) dismissed; 2438 (or 8%) reversed outright; 
446 (or 1.5%) remanded; and 389 (or 1.3%) terminated by other dispositionsu 
Accordingly, less than ten percent of the cases terminated on the merits were reversed 
outright with a finding that the lower court erred in its decision. The same statistical 
report for the same year shows a "percent reversed"' breakdown ranging from a high 
of 150/o in the D.C. Circuit to a low of 5.2% in the Tenth Circuit.14 In my own circuit, 
the percent reversed was 5.7, a reversal rate which has varied very little over recent 
years.15 Nor has there been much variation in the national "reversed" statistics.16 
Not included in the reversal rate are the cases where a lack of merit has resulted 
in dismissal or remand. However, an outright reversal rate of less than ten percent in 
case terminations on the merits on appeal leads to the inevitable conclusion that 
more than ninety percent of the appeals filed were found to be-without merit.17 Of 
course, an appeal found to lack merit certainly does not mean that the appeal lacks 
an arguable basis or was brought without substantial justification. But the statistics 
themselves compel the conclusion, by implication and logic, that a large part of that 
meritless ninety percent consists of appeals that are clearly meritless. It surely cannot 
be denied that the expansion of the appellate caseload explosion in recent years has 
been exacerbated, if not caused, by the filing of clearly meritless appeals. 
Especially burdensome to the appellate courts are cases filed by pro se litigants. 
It is no secret that the vast majority of pro se appeals are clearly without merit. Much 
time and effort is spent in trying to discern the nature of the challenges raised by 
12. AoMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JunrCIAL BUSINESS 
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 60 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF TIIE DIRECTOR], 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/Judicia1Business/2011/Judicia1Business2011. 
pdf. The number of total appeals filed for the period ending September 30, 2010 (59,526) or September 
30, 2011 (57,357) differs from the number of terminations as of these dates because termination data 
takes into consideration appeals that may have been filed in the prior year, which can result in a higher 
number of terminations than number of appeals in a given year. Cases terminated, but not terminated 
on the merits, include cases disposed ofby consolidation and procedural terminations. Id. 
13. Id. at 89. 
14. Id. at 89, 92. 
15. Id.at90. 
16. For the twelve-month periods ending in September 2010 and September 2011, the percentages have 
been 8.3% and 8.9%, respectively. Id. at 89; ADMIN. OFFICE OF-THE U.S. COURTS, 2010 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BusINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 111 (2010), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf. 
17. As used in this article, I define a "meritless appeal" as an appeal that fails to present for appellate review any 
cogent arguments adequately supported by law and fact. It is an appeal whose lack of merit is immediately 
apparent to any reasonable appellate jurist. A meritless appeal generally can be identified as one that lacks 
thoughtful application of established law or precedent to ascertainable facts of record. An appeal that puts 
forth a logical and.well-reasoned argument for the extension of existing law or for overrurning precedent is 
not substantially meritless under this definition. But such an appeal must have an objectively reasonable 
basis in law and fact. A meritless appeal, then, is one that cannot be sufficiently justified. 
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these litigants, and liberal consideration is given to their arguments.18 Despite the 
lack of success of prose litigants, they continue to file at an alarming rate-19,973 in 
1995 and 27,143 in 2011.19 Pro se filings constituted 39.89% of the caseload nationally 
in 1995 and 49.24% in 2011. 20 
Ill. ANALYZING THE CAUSES 
What possibly could account for the fact that litigants now appeal one in every 
six district court decisions, and what possibly could account for the fact that such a 
large proportion of appeals are found to be without merit? In the absence of a 
scientific survey, the causes of the increased rate of filings must rest in speculation 
informed by experience, anecdotal evidence, and the speech of the legal community. 
It seems certain, however, that many such appeals are driven by clients whose 
attorneys advise of the futility of appeal, but nevertheless insist that the appellate 
court will see the "justice" of their cause or defense despite the lack of legal merit. 
The costs of appeal constitute relatively small barriers to such clients, who often have 
expended considerable sums on trial-court proceedings. Some appellants use the 
appellate process as a means of"stalling for time," delaying through appeal what they 
know to be the inevitable outcome. Some may press meritless appeals for vindictive 
reasons, their aim being to cause additional expense and anxiety for their adversaries. 
Appellants who pursue appeals simply because they have nothing to lose 
undoubtedly account for some proportion of meritless appeals. In this category are pro 
se appellants who are free of the need to pay attorneys and who are generally responsible 
only for the payment of filing fees. 21 Those pro se litigants who have their applications 
granted to proceed under in farma pauperis status need not even pay filing fees. 22 Many 
18. See AnMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs,Junrc1AL BusINESS OF THE UN1TED STATES COURTS 2008, at 
45 tbl.S-4 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2008/tables/ 
S04Sep08.pdf; see also Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) ("[WJe 
construe pro se appellate briefs and submissions liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest 
arguments they suggest." (quoting Wright v. Comm'r, 381 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2004))). 
19. AoMrN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs, JuD1c1AL FACTS AND F1GUREs: MuLTI-YEAR STATISTICAL 
COMPILATIONS OF FEDERAL COURT CASELOAD THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2009, tbl.2.4 (2010) [hereinafter 
MULTI-YEAR STATISTICAL COMPILATIONS OF FEDERAL COURT CASELOAD THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 
2009], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2009/ 
alljudcialfactsandfigures.pdf; 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, supra note 12, at 32. 
20. MULTI-YEAR STATISTICAL COMPILATIONS OF FEDERAL COURT CASELOAD THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 
2009, supra note 19, at tbl.2.4; 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, supra note 12, at 39. 
21. "Notwithstanding any filing fee ... that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time 
if [it] determines that the action or appeal is frivolous .... " 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (2006). This 
extends not only to the courts of appeals but also to the district courts. Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. 
Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)~(2) (2006); FED. R. APP. P. 24(a)(5) ("A party may file a motion to proceed on 
appeal in forma pauperis in the court of appeals within 30 days after service of the notice prescribed in 
Rule 24(a)(4). The motion must include a copy of the affidavit filed in the district court and the district 
court's statement of reasons for its action. If no affidavit was filed in the district court, the party must 
include the affidavit prescribed by Rule 24(a)(l)."); see also 2D C1R. R. 24.1 ("Motion for In Forma 
Pauperis Status and Related Rdief') ("A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, for appointment of 
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indigent appellants who have pro bono counsel also fall into the "nothing to lose" class. 
In the same category are appellants in criminal cases who have the benefit of counsel 
appointed under the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act (CJA)-" 
Lawyers themselves sometimes motivate meritless appeals. According to a recent 
survey, some lawyers simply overestimate their chances of success. 24 Other lawyers 
pursue appeals lacking in substantive merit to demonstrate to the client that they 
continue to support the client's cause. Some, embarrassed that they lost in the trial 
court after advising that the client would- prevail, encourage meritless appeals in order 
to have another court to blame for a loss occaSioned by bad advice or bad lawyering. 
Some lawyers, loath to lose a client for failure to satisfy the client's command to appeal, 
go forward merely to satisfy the client's wishes. Some newly admitted attorneys, 
especially those associated with large law firms, pursue assigned pro bono appeals they 
know to be futile in order to gain experience in the appellate process. Finally, there are 
those lawyers who encourage appeals that have no chance of success simply (dare it be 
said?) to collect fees for briefing and argument in the appellate court. 
Some blame for the spike in appeals must also fall on the academic sector of the 
legal profession. The centerpiece of law school teaching continues to be appellate 
court decisions. 25 The leading moot court competitions involve appellate brief writing 
and oral argument. 26 This emphasis on the appellate process encourages law students 
counsel, or for a transcript at public expense must include (1) the affidavit prescribed by FRAP 24(a)(l), 
and (2) a statement that identifies the relevant facts and makes a showing of likely merit as to each issue 
the appellant intends to present on appeal. Failure to comply with any of these requirements may result in 
denial of the motion and dismissal of the appeal."). See generally FED. R. APP. P. 24(a). In addition to 
being relieved of the filing-fee requirement, a district court may direct paymellt by the United States of 
the expenses of printing the record on appeal, of preparing a transcript of proceedings, and of printing 
the record on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) (2006) {"Fees for transcripts 
furnished in other proceedings to persons permitted to appeal in forma pauperis shall also be paid by the 
United States if the trial judge or a circuit judge certifies that the appeal is not frivolous (but presents a 
substantial question)."). 
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (2006) (defining "Payment for Representation" under the Criminal Justice 
Act); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3011 (2006) (defining "Computation of Time"); FED. R. CRIM. P. 45. 
24. Amanda Bronstad, Attorneys Tend Toward Overconfidence, Researchers Find, N.Y.L.J., May 13, 2010, at 
6, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticlePrinterFriendlyNLJ.jsp?id=1202458011382; 
Martha Neil, Lawyers-Especially Men-May Be Too Optimistic About Case Outcomes, Survey Says, 
A.B.A. J. (May 11, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyers--especially_men--may_ 
be_too_optimistic_about_case_outcomes_survey_s/. 
25. John B. Attansio, Out-of-the-Box Dialogs: Foreword, 52 J. LEGAL Eouc. 473, 474 (2002). 
26. See MICHAEL D. MURRAY & CHRISTY HALLAM DESANCTIS, APPELLATE ADVOCACY AND MOOT 
COURT 179 (2006) eMoot Court competitions simulate appellate practice in particular ... . ");see also 
N.Y.C. BAR Ass'N, SIXTY-THIRD ANNUAL NATIONAL MooT CouRT COMPETITION, COMPETITION 
RULES AND COMMENTS 1 (2012) ("The New York City Bar Association's National Moot Court 
Competition is an annual inter-law school event designed to promote the art of appellate advocacy."); 
Colleen Walsh, Moot Points: Chief Justice Roberts Returns to HLS to Judge Ames Competition, I-IARV. 
GAZETTE (Nov. 17, 2010), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/11/moot-points/ ("Established 
in 1911, the Ames Moot Court Competition unfolds in three rounds over the course of two years and 
challenges students to develop briefs and oral arguments addressing legal issues that the Supreme Court 
has not addressed or answered on-point."). 
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to believe that any adverse trial court determination can and should be tested on 
appeal. Reinforcing this belief by example, many law professors seek to advance their 
expansive approaches to legal doctrine through the use of the appellate process. 
Sometimes they do so as amici curiae and sometimes as counsel for those seeking to 
promote various social justice issues through the courts rather than through the 
legislative process where they belong. These professors often are assisted in their 
endeavors by law students in "clinical studies" programs. Is it any wonder that newly 
minted lawyers see appellate courts as the most important locales for the applicatiOn 
of their law school skills training? In this they are of course wrong, for the greater 
part of their work will be done in the trial courts, in administrative proceedings, in 
negotiations, in transactional activities, and in providing legal advice to clients, both 
public and private. Specialists in appellate work are few and far between, and a 
relatively small percentage of appeals are sllccessful, as noted earlier in this article. 
Why, then, do the law schools place such emphasis on appellate court decisions 
and processes? The fault lies of course with the increasing disconnect between the 
professoriate and other branches of the legal profession, a matter that has been the 
subject of widespread comment. 27 Many professors have lost sight of their obligation 
to train lawyers in the skills and ethical responsibilities that will be pertinent to their 
employment. A good number of these academics have served as appellate clerks and 
have had little experience in the trial courts or in any type oflegal practice. They are 
most comfortable teaching and litigating at the appellate level, which is a more 
familiar territory for them. Today, it is the rare professor who does not dwell on 
constitutional issues or U.S. Supreme Court decisions in whatever subject he or she 
might teach. In view of these developments, the proliferation of the "legal scholars" 
of academe as well as the proliferation of the students they educate28 gives cause for 
concern. I do not mean to say that there should be fewer law students and fewer 
27. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Diijunction between Legal Education and the Legal Proftssion, 91 
MICH. L. REv. 34, 34 (1992); Roger]. Miner, A Significant Symfosium, 54 N.Y.L. Sett. L. REV. 15, 
18-20 (2009-2010); see also Roger J. Miner, Identifying, Protecting and Preserving Individual Rights: 
Traditional Federal Court Functions, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 821, 821-22 (1993); William R. Trail & 
William D. Undeiwood, The Decline ef Proftssional Legal Training and a Proposal for its Revitalization in 
Proftssional Law Schools, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 201, 202-03 (1996). 
28. The Law School Admissions Council (LSAC) reports that since the 2000-2001 cycle, the number of 
Law School Admission Tests (LSATs) administered has risen, from 109,000 in 2000-2001 to a 
staggering 171,500 in 2009-2010 and to 129,958 in the 2010-2011 cycle. LSAC Volume Summary, 
LSAC, available at http://www.lsac.org/LSACResources/Data/LSAC-volume-summary.asp (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2013); see also Rebecca R. Ruiz, Recession is Pushing Up Law Schoo/Applications and Interest 
in Graduate Studies, N.Y. TrMES, Jan. 10, 2010, at A18; Debra Cassens Weiss, October LSATTest-Taker 
Numbers Are 2nd Highest Ever, A.B.A. J. {Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
october_lsat_numbers_are_2nd_highest_ever/. But see Debra Cassens Weiss, Are Smartest People 
Avoiding Law School? Stats Show Bigger Drop in High LSAT Applicants,_A.B.A.]. (Apr. 11, 2012), http:// 
www.abajournal.com/news/article/are_smartest_people_discouraged_avoiding_law_school_stats_ 
show_bigger_drop_/; Matt Leichter, What the Numbers Don't Say: Law School Applicants Are Getting. 
Older, Not Dumber, AM. LAW. (Apr. 19, 2012, 3:57 PM) http://www.americanlawyer.com/ 
PubArticleTAL.jsp?id,.1202549589531 (noting the ~wave of news stories about the latest Law School 
Admission Council's (LSAC) Current Volume Summary, which shows a notable drop not only in the 
number of applicants, but also in the number of applicants with high LSAT scores"). 
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professors just to cut down on the volume of appeals. I do say that greater emphasis 
in legal education should be placed on the duty oflawyers to assist in the effective 
functioning of the legal system. 29 It seems to me that this duty includes the obligation 
to decline the pursuit of meritless appeals. The performance of this duty will be of 
great benefit to overburdened appellate courts. 
In any analysis of the causes of the appellate caseload crisis, criminal appeals are 
worthy of special scrutiny. As an early critic of the federalization of criminal law, I 
estimated that there were about 3000 federal criminal offenses in the then-fifty titles 
of the U.S. Code. 30 Current estimates run as high as 4500, to say nothing of the 
thousands of federal regulations that criminalize all sorts of conduct deemed contrary 
to the public good. 31 The problems implicated in the federalization of criminal law 
have long been recognized. 32 The problems implicated in overcriminalization have 
now become the focus of attention,. going so far as to draw the interest of a 
congressional subcommittee. 33 Whatever the consequences of federalization and 
overcriminalization, it cannot be gainsaid that criminal cases are a major cause of an 
expanding appellate caseload. More federal crimes equal more criminal prosecutions. 
In 1990, 48,035 criminal cases were filed in the nation's district courts. 34 By 2009, 
the number had climbed to 65,394.35 
29. Miner, A Significant Symposium, supra note 27, at 19 ("[LJaw schools ate falling short" in effectively providing 
the "required courses necessary for the training of lawyers .... [TJhat is, 'persons learned in the law."'}. 
30. Roger J. Miner, Crime and Punishment in the Federal Courts, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 681, 681 (1992). 
31. See JottN BAKER, REVISITING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIMES, No. 26 (2008), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/06/Revisiting-the-Explosive-Growth-of-Federal-
Crimes#_ftn3; see also BRIAN WALSH, THE CRIMINAL INTENT REPORT: CONGRESS MusT JusTIFY NEW 
CRIMINALIZATION, No. 2933 (June 9, 2010), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/ 
Reports/2010/06/The-Criminal-lntent-Report-Congress-Must-Justify-New-Criminalization (estimating 
that there are over 4450 federal crimes in the U.S. Code and up to 300,000 federal regulations that can be 
enforced with criminal penalties); Robert C. Scott, Commentary: The Overcriminalization of Federal Law, 
MAIN JusTICE (Sept. 28, 2010, 3:39 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/09/28/commentary-the-
overcriminaliztion-of-federal-law/. 
32. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. 
AcAo. PoL. & Soc. Sci. 39 (1996) (noting that the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction has threatened 
the effective :functioning of federal courts); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischiefi The Federalization of 
American Criminal Law, 46 I"lASTlNGS LJ. 1135, 1135-37 (1995) (arguing that expanding federal criminal 
law cannot be reconciled with principles of federalism); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 
54 AM. U. L. REv. 703 (2005) (recognizing the criminalization phenomenon); Miner, supra note 30, at 
683-85 (arguing that too many state crimes are prosecuted in federal courts). 
33. The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security has held two hearings 
on the problems of overcriminalization of conduct and overfederalization of criminal law. Reining in 
Overcriminalization: Assessing the Problems, Proposing Solutions: Hearing Befare the H Subcomm. on Crime, 
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., lllth Cong. (2010); Over~Criminalization ofConduct/Over-Federilliz.ation of 
Criminal Law: Hearing Befare the H Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec., lllth Cong. (2009). 
34. ADMlN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. Cot.iRTS, JuorCIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2005, tbl.5.1 (2005), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2005/alljudicialfactsfigures.pdf. 
35. APMlN. OFFICE OF THE lJ.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATTSTics2009: U.S. DISTRICT 
COURT-]UDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc,,/cgi-bin/ 
cmsd2009.pl (select "All District Courts" from drop-down menu then click "Generate"). 
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More criminal prosecutions of course equal more appeals. In 1990, when the 
appellate caseload crisis was identified, 9642 criminal appeals were filed. 36 In 2011, 
12,198 criminal appeals were filed, an increase of 26.51%.37 This number has been 
fairly steady for the past three years, 38 although a high of 16,060 was reached in 
2005.39 The proliferation of federal crimes has required more law enforcement agents 
and more prosecutors, but there has been no correspondent increase in the number of 
judges who hear criminal appeals. 
All of this, of course, is the doing of Congress, which needs to take a hard look 
at overcriminalization and overfederalization, not only because of the impact of such 
factors on the caseloads of the federal courts, but also because it is the right thing to 
do. No sensible person would say that the transport of water hyacinths in interstate 
commerce should be a federal offense.40 Nor would any sensible person believe that 
garden-variety state drug offenses should be prosecuted in federal court.41 The list 
goes on, and the result is a federal system warehousing too many inmates at too great 
an expense,42 and an avalanche of federal appeals filed on behalf of those convicted 
of these crimes. In the Final Report, the crisis of volume in the federal appeals courts 
was said to be caused "mainly by a heightened proclivity to appeal district court 
terminations."43 Having analyzed various factors underlying an even more "heightened 
proclivity" two decades later, I now turn to some of its consequences. 
36. ADM IN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs, juo1c1AL FAcTs AND FIGURES 2005, tbl.2.3 (2005), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2005/Table203.pdf 
37. FEDERAL CouRT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 2011, supra note 10. 
38. See id. In 2010, 12,797 crim~al appeals were :filed, and in 2009, the number was 13,710. Id. 
39. FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 2010, supra note 6. 
40. See 18 U.S.<:. § 46 (2006) ("Whoever knowingly delivers or receives for transportation, or transports, in 
interstate commerce ... water hyacinth plants ... [s]hall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not 
more than six months, or both."). 
41. In a report released by the Director of the Office of Research and Data of the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, it was reported that drug offenses represented 30.3% of the cases (25,206 convictions) in 
the federal system, including 760 convictions for "an offense involving simple possession of a drug." U.S. 
SENTENCING COMMISSION, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES FISCAL YEAR 2009 2, 5 (2010), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Publications/2010/2010123 O _FY09 _Overview_ 
Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf. Prosecuting these types of state drug offenses in federal court has been 
the subject of widespread criticism. Miner, supra note 30, at 683. 
42. According to the fiscal year 2009 annual report of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the BOP housed 
208,759 federal inmates in 2009. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT 
57 (2009); see also Miner, supra note 30, at 688~89 (analyzing the issue as it existed in 1990). 
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IV. REVIEWING THE CONSEQUENCES 
The Committee saw the consequences of a spiraling appellate caseload as 
jeopardizing the need "to preserve the hallmarks of our judiciary.'"" Its Final Report 
defined the "hallmarks" to 
include that the judges do most of their own work, grant oral argument in 
cases that need it, decide cases with sufficient thought, and produce opinions 
in cases of precedential importance with the care they deserve, including 
independent, constructive insight and criticism from judges on the court and 
the panel other than the judge writing the opinion.45 
The Committee opined that the foregoing "conditions are essential to a carefully 
crafted caselaw" and concluded that "[m]odem society requires no less."46 
More than twenty years ago, the Committee found that "[t]oday's federal 
appellate courts have been able to provide these conditions only through increases in 
productivity that seem to be approaching their limit."47 Attempts to further raise 
"productivity" by such measures as increasing staff and reducing oral argument were 
said to be such as could "threaten the integrity of the process."48 Anyone familiar 
with the operation of the federal appellate court system over the past two decades 
will have noticed a continuing erosion of "hallmarks" that an overburdened judiciary 
just cannot maintain.49 One of the major consequences is the reliance on staff to 
achieve the nei:essary productivity. 
44. Id. at 109; see also Robert A. Katzmann, The 2005 National Conference on Appellate Justice: Selected 
Presentation from the General Sessions: No Court is an Island, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 115, 116 (2006) 
(discussing how a "host of issues," including, inter a!ia, the "prospect of an ever-rising caseload; 
federalization of the law; resource constraints; [and] compensation," can affect not only the judiciary but 
the relationship between it and the other branches of government). See generally FED. JuorcIAL CTR., 
MANAGING APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL CouRTS 13-207, 535-691 (Robert A. Katzmann & Michael 
Tonry eds., 1988) (setting forth the Federal Judicial Center's major research concerning the "crisis of 
volume" in, the case management in, and administration of the federal courts of appeals). 
45. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 109. 
46. Id.; see also Frank M. Coffin & Robert A. Katzmann, Steps Towards Optimal judicial Workways: 
Perspectives from the Federal Bench, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 377, 378 (2003) (recognizing that "if 
justice is to be dispensed fairly, efficiently, and wisely, then judges must have the time to devote to their 
responsibilities, both adjudicative and administrative, as well as the necessary resources; and the 
judiciary must have the authority, within reasonable limits and with appropriate accountability, to 
manage its own affairs, free from political retribution"). 
47. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 109. 
48. Id. 
49. See Coffin & Katzmann, supra note 46, at 378 ("'O]udicial dispositions are not widgets, and at some point 
the optimal number of decisions per judge may be exceeded. Productivity cannot be increased indefinitely 
without loss in the quality of justice."' (quoting A. Leo Levin, Foreword to Joe. S. Cecil, Administration of 
Justice in a Large Appellate Court: The Ninth Circuit Innovations Project, in FED. JuDICIAL CTR., MANAGING 
APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, at vii (Robert A. Katzmann & Michael Tonry eds., 1988))); see also 
John G. McCarthy, A Practitioner's View oj the Distincti'Ue Practices of the Second Circuit, FED. LAW. 41, 41 
(Feb. 2006) ("The Second Circuit is the last bastion of oral argument in the Courts of Appeals of this 
country. Even with a caseJoad that now exceeds 7,000 filings annually, the court has held firm its 
conviction that oral argument of an appeal should be the norm, not the exception."). 
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While active courts of appeals judges usually are assisted by four law clerks and a 
judicial assistant,50 they also are assisted by staff attorneys, who provide support to 
the judges in various aspects of their work. 51 In my own court, the Staff Attorneys' 
Office is headed by a Director of Legal Affairs. There are approximately four 
supervisory staff attorneys, twenty staff attorneys, and an administrative staff of 
nine.52 The major responsibilities of the staff attorneys pertain to motions and prose 
matters, for which they prepare bench memoranda and proposed dispositions. There 
is also a separate Immigration Unit consisting of two supervisory attorneys and nine 
immigration attorneys. Their responsibilities lie in the processing of immigration 
cases assigned to the non-argument calendar.53 They prepare memoranda and 
proposed dispositions for the cases to which they are assigned. Our Civil Appeals 
Management Program (CAMP) has two attorneys with preargument responsibilities 
in civil cases and an administrative staff of three.54 Among other things, the CAMP 
attorneys confer with counsel for the parties in civil cases in an attempt to narrow 
the-issues for appeal and effect settlements.55 The Office of the Clerk of Court has 
two attorneys on staff-an administrative attorney and a motions staff attorney. 
What use is made of all this legal firepower? It is used, of course, in the decisional 
process. It is no secret that the first drafts of opinions of the court frequently are 
undertaken by the judges' law clerks.56 Similarly, staff attorneys prepare proposed 
orders for the disposition of motions and, in our court, for the disposal of immigration 
50. 28 U.S.C. § 712 (2006) ("Circuit Judges may appoint necessary law clerks and secretaries."); see also]. 
Daniel Mahoney, Law Clerks: For Better or for Worse?, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 321, 326 (1988) ("The number of 
law clerks is not specified by statute; rather, a general provision for each court authorizes the hiring of law 
clerks, and the number of clerks is set in line items as part of the annual judicial appropriations act."). 
51, See Office efLegalAjfairs, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, http://www.ca2.uscourts. 
gov/1egalaffairs2.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
52. lJ.S. CoURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, DIRECTORY'. U.S. COOR.TS FOR THE SECOND 
C1RCUIT (Mar. 7, 2011) (on file with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, New York, N.Y.) 
53. See Elizabeth Cronin, When the Deluge Hits and You Never Saw the Storm: Asylum Overload and the Second 
Circuit, 59 AnMIN. L. REv. AM. U. 547, 555 (2007) ("To assist in [asylum cases on the non-argument 
calendar], the Staff Attorney's Office within the Office of Legal Affairs became authorized to hire a 
supervisor and ... attorneys to establish an immigration unit."). Pursuant to Second Circuit Local Rule 
34.2, the court maintains a non-argument calendar for immigration cases raising claims for asylum, 
withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act, withholding or deferral of removal 
under the Convention Against Torture, or a motion to reopen or reconsider an order involving one of 
the preceding substantive claims. 2d CIR. R. 34.2 ("Non~Argument Calendar"). 
54. U.S. CoURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, DIRECTORY: U.S. COURTS FOR THE SECOND 
C1RCUit (Mar. 7, 2011) (on file with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, New York, N.Y.). 
55. In my court, almost all counseled civil appeals are referred to the Civil Appeals Management Plan for 
review, and such participation is mandatory. See 2n CIR. R. 33.1; see also Irving R. Kaufman, Comment, 
Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut?-The Civil Appeals Management Plan, 95 YALE L.J. 755 (1986). 
56. See, e.g., Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal jurisdiction Opinions, 46 
lJCLA L. REV. 75 (1998) (stating that the first drafts of judicial opinions are sometimes drafted by law 
clerks); Mahoney, supra note 50, at 339 (noting that law clerks assist judges in drafting judicial opinions); 
Penelope Pether, Sorcerers, not Apprentices: How judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 
39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 6 (2007) (commenting that unpublished opinions are drafted by law clerks and 
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cases scheduled for the non-argument calendar. The sheer volume of cases makes 
reliance upon staff inevitable. Some say that this is leading to the bureaucratization 
of the judiciary.57 It cannot be denied that appellate judges, although they still retain 
the power to decide, serve more and riiore as managers and editors in response to the 
demands for productivity in the face of the expanding volume of cases. But laying 
out the path to a decision is often the most important part of the decisional process. 
Rather than playing an adjunctive role in this regard, staff increasingly provides the 
path. And therein lies the erosion of the hallmark that judges do "their own work.'' 
The increased use of staff itself has consequences. The majority of staff is fresh out 
of law school and anxious to display their vast legal knowledge. The result is opinions 
that are overly lengthy and replete with basic legal precedent that every opinion reader 
should be familiar with. 58 One need not rehearse all the elements of a contract in every 
opinion resolving a breach of contract claim. While it is true that the judge is the 
ultimate decisionmaker, the system suffers when staff provides a longer path when a 
shorter one will do. The result may be an opinion not only much longer than necessary 
but also bfoader than necessary to resolve the issue before the court. 59 
The higher the volume of cases decided in the federal appellate courts, the higher 
the number of intercircuit conflicts there will _be. The result is inevitable, given the 
fact that two or more of the thirteen circuits are constrained to deal with novel issues 
of law and sometimes resolve them in different ways. Every month, United States 
Law Week provides a list of conflicting decisions rendered in variolis circuits during 
the preceding month. 60 And although intercircuit conflict is one of the criteria for 
granting certiorari in the Supreme Court, 61 only a small proportion of intercircuit 
conflicts are resolved by the nation's highest court each year. 62 Consequently, the law 
reviewed by the judge); Douglas 0. Tice, Jr., Reflections on Opinion Writing and Publishing: Part II, 26 
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 52, 52 (2007) (same). 
57. Hunter Smith, Personal and Official Authority: Turn-of-the-Century Lawyers and the Dissenting Opinion, 
24 YALE].L. & HuMAN. 507, 526-29 (2012) (describing the expansion of judicial support staff and the 
"bureaucratization" of the judiciary). 
58. See Roger]. Miner, Planning.far the Second Century of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals: The Report of the 
Federal Courts Study Committee, 65 ST. ]OHN's L. REV. 673, 712-13 (1991); see also Mahoney, supra note 
50, at 339-40. 
59. Some research "suggests that the busier a court is (in terms of the work required of each judge) the less 
likely it is to cite to legal scholarship" and "predicts that reported opinions citing legal scholarship 
decline as the number of reported opinions authored per active circuit judge increases." David L. 
Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical 
Study, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 1345, 1366 (2011). While some see this as a negative byproduct of the 
caseload crisis, I think, as I always have advocated, that judges should be concerned with precedent 
rather than the legal scholarship of today, such as Rebecca R. French, The Case of the Missing Discipline: 
Finding Buddhist Legal Studies, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 679 (2004). See Miner, A Significant Symposium, supra 
note 27, at 23-24. 
60. See Bureau ofNat'l Affairs, Inc., Circuit Splits Reported in US. Law Week-September 2012, 81 U.S. L. 
WK. 467 (2012). 
61. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 124-25. 
62. See id. 
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becomes "fractured," with different rules applying in different parts of the country. 
This situation would seem to be intolerable to most citizens, although the Federal 
Court Study Committee had this to say about intercircuit conflicts: 
Some conflicts, of course, may have the redeeming feature, especially in the 
constitutional area, of helping to devdop legal doctrine and insight. Other 
conflicts need rapid resolution. Conflicts over some procedural rules and laws 
affecting actors in only one circuit at a time may have a negligible effect. A 
federal judicial system, however, must be able within a reasonable time to 
provide a nationally binding construction of these acts of Congress needing a 
single, unified construction in order to serve their purpose. 63 
The Final Report went on to discuss various criteria established by commentators to 
distinguish "tolerable" conflicts from "intolerable" ones. 64 The Committee ultimately 
recognized "the proposition that there are an excessive number of unresolved 
intercircuit conflicts. "65 
The exploding federal appellate caseload has led to a vastly increased use of 
summary dispositions marking the termination of the decisional process.66 These 
dispositions are sometimes referred to as unpublished_ opinions, although they now 
are actually published and available to the public online as well as in periodic print 
publications. 67 A great debate preceded the adoption of the present federal rule 
governing these summary dispositions, owing to the fact that many circuits either 
prohibited the publication or denied precedence to the dispositions they represented. 68 
One school of thought went so far as to consider such prohibitions unconstitutional. 69 
In any event, ~he new rule provides that a court may not prohibit or restrict the 
63. Id. at 125. 
64. See id. 
65. Id. 
66. See David C. Vladeck &Mitu Gulati, judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate ()'{)er Unpublished Opinions, 
62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1673, 1708 (2005) ("[T]he workload burdens on our federal appellate 
courts have grown to the point where something must be done or else the published opinion will become 
a statistical anomaly."). 
67- West publishes "opinions and decisions from 2001 to date issued by the U.S. courts of appeals that are not 
selected for publication in the Federal Reportd' in the Federal Appendix. Federal Appendix: Description, 
THOMSONREUTERS.COM, http://legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/Reporters/Federal-
Appendix/p/100000796 (last visited Feb. 22, 2013). 
68. See Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie Wallace Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publication and 
Citation of Opinions: An Update, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 349, 351 (2004) (comparing publication 
standards and citation rules for each of the circuit courts in Table 1). For a survey of the widespread 
commentary, see 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. CooPER &RICHARD D. 
FREER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3506 n.42 (3d ed. 2012); see also 16AA CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER &CATHERINE T. STRUVE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE§ 3978.10 nn.10-11 (4th ed. 2012). 
69. Anastasoffv. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot on reh'gen bane, 235 F.3d 
1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Eighth Circuit's local rule on discouraging citation to unpublished_ 
opinions, "insofar as it would allow us to avoid the precedential effect of our prior decisions, purports to 
expand the judicial power beyond the bounds of Article III, and is therefore unconstitutional"). 
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citation of a written disposition eV-en though marked "unpublished," "not for 
publication," "non-precedential," "not precedent," or similarly designated.70 The 
summary orders issued by my court still contain the following designation: 
"RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL 
EFFECT."71 Other courts also deny precedential effect to designated opinions.72 But 
why cite an opinion that has no such effect? The courts themselves seem confused by 
the designation. For example, my own court has stated that "denying summary 
orders['] precedential effect does not mean that the court considers itself free to rule 
differently in similar cases."73 What then does it mean? 
In any event, the use of summary dispositions has gained favor over time as a 
means of conserving judicial resources. These "unpublished opinions," whatever they 
are called, were developed strictly as a shortcut to a disposition and in response to a 
caseload that does not permit a full opinion in every case. Many of these abbreviated 
writings start out by "assum[ing] the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the 
procedural history, and the issues presented for review."74 The use of these dispositions 
is predicated on the assumption that the facts pertailling to the case are crystal clear 
and the applicable law well settled. This is always a questionable assumption. 
More than two decades ago, long before the "no publication" rules were 
superseded, the Committee wrote the following: "There are also doctrinal reasons 
for questioning the non-publication rules: litigants should be able to argue that they 
are indeed similarly situated to a party in a previous case, even if the court thought it 
not significant enough to warrant publication."75 Any doctrinal concerns, however, 
have been outweighed by the need for summary disposition occasioned by the crisis 
of volume. And whether designated "unpublished" or "non-precedential," there has 
been a spectacular rise in such dispositions,76 as illustrated by the following national 
statistics issued by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 
In 1990, case dispositions classified as "oral" numbered 94.77 dispositions 
classified as "written, signed" numbered 6008 designated as published and 2347 
designated as unpublished. 78 Dispositions classified as "written, reasoned, unsigned" 
70. FED. R. APP. P. 32.l(a). See generally Katzmann, supra note 44, at 116 (explaining how the rule that 
summary orders can be cited will invariably ~affect how courts of appeals write those orders"). 
71. See, e.g., Donovan v. Centerpulse Spine Tech Inc., 416 F. App'x 104 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Gonzalez, 415 F. App'x 336 (2d Cir. 2011). 
72. See WRIGHT, MILLER, CooPER & STRUVE, supra note 68, § 3978.10. 
73. United States v. Payne, 591 F.3d 46, 58 (2d Cir. 2010) (interpreting 2D CrR. R. 32.1). 
74. See Don0'1Jan, 416 F. App'x at 105; Gonzalez, 415 F. App'x at 337. 
75. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 130. 
76. See Vladeck & Gulati, supra note 66, at 1670 (footnotes omitted) (~At present, fewer than 20% of appellate 
cases decided on the merits are resolved in written, published opinions. And that percentage is dwindling."). 
77. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES: MULTI-YEAR STATISTICAL 
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numbered 712 published and 9669 unpublished.79 In the classification of "written, 
unsigned without comment" there were 4 published and 2161 unpublished 
dispositions. 80 Within these classifications, 14,204 dispositions by opinion or order 
were unpublished, or 68.01% of the total. 81 
Eighteen years later, there were no oral dispositions and in the "written, signed" 
category there were 4949 dispositions published and 5870 unpublished.82 The 
"written, reasoned, unsigned" category included 388 published and 17,399 
unpublished. 83 The category designated "written, unsigned without comment" 
contained 40 published and 962 unpublished.84 The unpublished total for the year 
2008 was 24,231, amounting to 81.84% of the total!85 Even under the new regime, 
when all dispositions are "published" and may be cited, one may wonder whether the 
nonprecedential status of over 80% of all decisions leads to a confused jurisprudence. 
Oral argument has been a big loser as caseloads continue to rise. Much has been 
written about the value of oral argument, which most lawyers and judges have always 
thought to be an important ingredient of appellate advocacy. 86 To me, it has been a 








86. See Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second Circuit, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 297, 
306-07 (1986) (discussing the benefits of oral argument); Joseph W. Hatchett & Robert]. Telfer III, 
The Importance of Appellate Oral Argument, 33 STETSON L. REV. 139, 150-51 (2003) (concluding that 
"[o]ral argument may be the most critical aspect of [an] appeal"). As Justice Harlan put it: 
I should like to leave with you, particularly those of you who are among the younger 
barristers, the thought that your oral argument on an appeal is perhaps the most effective 
weapon you have got if you will give it the rime and attention it deserves. Oral argument 
is exciting and will return rich dividends if it is done well. And I think it will be a sorry 
day for the American bar if the place of the oral argument in our appellate courts is 
depreciated and oral advocacy becomes looked upon as a pro forma exercise which, 
because of tradition or because of the insistence of his client, a lawyer has to go through. 
John M. Harlan, What Part Does the Oral Argument Play in the Canduct ef an Appeal?, 41 CORNELC L.Q. 
6, 7 (1955). But see Debra Cassens Weiss, Think Oral Arguments are Important? Think Again, justice Ali to 
Says, A.B.A.]. (May 17, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/think_oral_arguments_are_ 
important_think_again_alito_says. 
87. Roger]. Miner, Common Disorders ef the Appendix and Their Treatment, 3 ]. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 39, 
39-40 (2001) ("The three elements of appellate advocacy-preparation of the brief, compilation of the 
appendix, and presentation of oral argument-are co-equal in importance. Indeed, it is excellence in all 
three elements of a case on appeal that is the hallmark of successful appellate advocacy."). From my 
perspective-as one who has been a target of appellate argument for some twenty-seven years-I 
disagree with those who would just as soon see oral argument to a final resting place, a historical artifact 
to be celebrated only in law school moot courts. 
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counsel an opportunity to advance their contentions in a way that the written brief 
does not. Appellate advocates who argue before the court are able to provide emphasis 
to the points they consider important to their clients. 88 Oral argument provides 
judges with the opportunity to test counsel on the critical points in their cases and, 
through questioning of the lawyers 1 to share their thoughts with their colleagues on 
the panel as well as counsel. Counsel usually relish the opportunity to respond to 
questions from the court in order to dispel any doubts that the court may have about 
the positions they have taken. A not unimportant function of oral argument is its 
"public face." The exchange between counsel and judges in open court is the only 
means that the public has to observe appellate courts in operation. The actual 
decisionmaking process is necessarily accomplished out of public view, taking place 
as it does in the conference rooms and chambers of the appellate judges. A well-
known aphorism notes the need not only to do justice but also to see justice done.89 
The oral argument of appeals provides the citizenry with some insight in this regard. 
It is for this reason that I have long advocated the televising of oral arguments, 
especially arguments in the Supreme Court.90 
Whatever benefits oral argument may provide, those benefits are greatly 
diminished by the severe time limits now imposed by the courts of appeals. Rule 25 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1891 provided a time limit for 
oral argument of appeals as follows: "[t]wo hours on each side will be allowed for the 
argument, and no more, without special leave of the court, granted before the 
argument begins."91 As to motions, Rule 21 provided: "[o]ne hour on each side shall 
be allowed to the argument of a motion, and no more, without special leave of the 
court, granted before the argument begins."92 Today, even the allowance of fifteen 
minutes for the argument of an appeal is a rarity. Argument time is fixed by the 
judge presiding over the panel to which the appeal is assigned, and it is the unusual 
case that does not fall into the seven-to-ten minute category for arguments. The 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure as well as our local rule in the Second Circuit 
allow the court to determine when oral argument is unnecessary and to dispose of it 
88. See Michael Duvall, When is Oral Argument Important? A judicial Clerk's View of the Debate, 9 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 121, 125 (2007) ("Oral argument can prompt the judges to 'zero in' on the precise 
turning point in an important case, which helps both the courts and litigants achieve a thorough, 
correct, and timely decision. In a 'fifty/fifty,' 'fifty-one/forty-nine,' or even a 'sixty/forty' case, the 
importance of this impact cannot be overstated."). 
89. See R v. Sussex Justices, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, 259 ("[I]t is not merely of some importance but is of 
fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be 
seen to be done."); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564-75 (1980) 
(detailing the value and history of open justice in the courts). 
90. See Roger J. Miner, Eye on]ustice, 67 N.Y. ST. B.]. 8 (1995). 
91. 2D CIR. R. 25 (1892), reprinted in ERASTUS C. BENEDICT, THE AMERICAN ADMIRALTY, ITS JuRISDICTION 
AND PRACTICE 412-22 (3d ed. 1894). 
92. Id. at R. 21. 
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altogether.93 Many courts have established processes to "screen out" cases deemed not 
worthy of oral argument. Our long tradition in the Second Circuit has been to have 
oral argument in all cases, except for appeals by pro se incarcerated prisoners. We 
still do not employ a screening process, but we have established a non-argument 
calendar for certain types of immigration review cases,94 and at one time maintained 
a non-argument calendar for some sentencing appeals.95 
It is now highly unusual for a motion to be argued in the Court of Appeals fur the 
Second Circuit. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that "[a] motion 
will be decided without oral argument unless the Court orders otherwise."96 The 
Internal Operating Procedures of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit provide 
that "[i]f the court orders oral argument on a motion, the motion will ordinarily be 
heard on a Tuesday when the court is in session."97 The motions calendared for Tuesday 
in the Second Circuit are designated as "counseled motions" and usually consist of five 
or six cases for which oral argument is rarely ordered. When argument is heard, the 
time customarily allowed is five minutes. Motions to ftle successive petitions for habeas 
corpus, motions by pro se litigants, and Anders motions all are taken by the court on 
submission only on designated days of a sitting week.98 As many as twenty-five to 
thirty motions may be submitted on one pro se motion per day. As valuable as the oral 
argument of motions, especially of counseled motions, might be, volume and time 
constraints make the argument of motions all but impossible. 
In reviewing the consequences of excessive volume, I now tum to the subject of 
collegiality, an important element of any enterprise requiring joint effort in pursuit of a 
common goal.99 The caseload crisis impacts collegiality in various ways. For one thing, 
courts of appeals are now more reliant on visiting judges to get the job done.100 District 
court judges from the same circuit and district, and circuit judges from other circuits, 
are called upon to assist the courts of appeals that are more seriously burdened by their 
caseloads. An intercircuit assignment .system is in place, and all courts of appeals now 
93, The court need not permit oral argument in a case where a panel unanimously agrees that "the appeal is 
frivolous" or "the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively decided." FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2); 
2n CrR. R. 34.l(b). 
94. 2D CIR. R. 34.2(a)(1). 
95. Starting in early 2008, certain types of sentencing appeals were assigned to the non-argument calendar. 
Once the court became current on the criminal docket in or around 2010, sentencing-only criminal 
cases were calendared instead to the regular argument calendar; however, they now are proposed as 
submitted cases. See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management 
in the Circuit Courts, 61 DuKE L.J. 315, 349-50 (2011). 
96. FED. R. APP. P. 27(e). 
97. 2D CIR. IOP 27.1. 
98. GORDON MEHLER ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE: A SECOND CIRCUIT 1-IANDBOOK §§ 12-13 
(12th ed. 2012). 
99. See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 5 (2003) (discussing how collegiality among judges affects appellate adjudication). 
l 00. See JENNIFER EVANS MARSH, FE'O. JuDICIAL CTR., THE UsE OF VISITING JUDGES IN THE FEDERAL 
DtSTIUCT COURTS: A GUIDE FOR JUDGES & COURT PERSONNEL 41 (2001). 
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use visiting judges to some degree.101 There is therefore less opportunity to sit with 
judges of our own court. The number of seats on the court has an impact of collegiality 
because, as the number of judges grows, the rotation of panels becomes such that one 
will sit with a colleague fewer times during the course of a year.102 When I first came 
to my court, the membership of a panel was the same for an entire week at a time.103 
After the completion of arguments we would retire to chambers, and each member of 
the panel would then circulate to the other panel members a brief voting memorandum 
pertaining to the cases heard that day. On Friday afternoon, the panel convened in the 
chambers of the judge who had presided that week to confer and review our voting 
memoranda.104 After each judge was heard as to each case, a fmal vote was taken and 
the opinion assigned by the presiding judge.105 
Today, it is rare for one judge to sit for the entire week in the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit. Judges rotate, and out of each week's panel, some sit for as 
little as one or two days.106 Accordingly, the conference of the judges is held after 
each day's sitting, and the discussions customarily are brief. A tentative vote is 
recorded as to each case and the opinion assigned, but from time to time the vote is 
postponed so that a memorandum may be circulated after the judges have had more 
time to think about a proper disposition.107 The lengthy face-to-face discussions of 
the past are replaced by abbreviated conferences with constantly changing judicial 
personnel. Obviously, collegiality in the sense of the opportunity to interact with 
colleagues is lessened as the volume of cases increases.108 In this way, the "hallmark" 
of the judiciary that "independent, constructive insight and criticism [should be 
l 01. See id. at 1. 
102. Seegenera!lyGoRDON BERMANT ET AL., FEo.JunrcrAL CTR., IMPOSING A MoRATORIUM ON THE NUMBER 
OF FEDERAi. JUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS (1993) (noting that "there are also 
ways to deal with problems of diminished collegiality other than a ceiling on the number of judgeships"). 
l 03. See Mahoney, supra note 50, at 329. 
104. See generally McCarthy, supra note 49, at 41, 43 (discussing the Second Circuit's practice of using voting 
memoranda). 
105. See generally Feinberg, supra note 86. 
l 06. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 291(a), 292(d)-(e), 293(a), 294(d) (2006); MARSH, supra note 100, at app. C (Certificate 
of Necessity); id. at app. E (Guidelines for the Intercircuit Assignment of Article III Judges (approved 
by the Chief Justice Oct. 21, 1997)); see also Richard B. Saphire &Michad E. Solimine, Diluting Justice 
on Appeal?: An Examination ef the Use ef District Court judges Sitting by Designation o"n the United States 
Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 351, 360-61 (1995) (discussing the temporary use of district 
judges in the courts of appeals). 
l 07. See Feinberg, supra note 86, at 298-303. 
l 08. See Charles Clark, A Flea/thy and Diverse judiciary ("Such an unwieldy bureaucracy has the potential to 
smother justice as we know it. Character and collegiality will become rare, if not extinct, in such a swollen 
system."), in FED. JuDICIAL CTR., THE FEDERAL APPELLATE Jun1CIARY IN THE 21sT CENTURY 163, 166 
(Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989); Patricia M. Wald; Calendars, Collegiality, and Other 
Intangibles on the Courts ef Appeals, in FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE FEDERAL ArPEI.LATE JunICIARY IN THE 
21sT CENTURY 171, 180 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989); Harrison L. Winter, 
Goodwill and Dedication, in FED. Juo1CIAL CTR., THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21sT 
CENTURY 167 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989); see also DoNALD ]OHN MEADOR & 
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provided] from judges on the court and the panel other than the judge writing the 
opinion" has been eroded.109 
Nevertheless, the use of senior judges is one measure to maintain collegiality and 
to respond to the increasing appellate caseload.110 The use of senior judges "fills the 
gaps caused by personnel needs," because senior judges continue to serve on the 
circuit courts' three-judge panels, participate in oral arguments, cast their vote or 
"tab," author opinions, and remain a full part of a case's decisional process.111 Indeed, 
the "number of senior judges has risen sharply since its inception in 1918."112 But I 
agree that a "strong case may be made that the rise in senior status judges has been a 
contributing factor to reducing the burdens of expanding caseloads."113 Given the 
current caseload in the appellate courts, the circuit courts have had to rely on not 
only senior judges but also district judges to constitute daily panels in the circuit 
courts.114 This reliance, although very beneficial, might also contribute to a lessened 
opportunity to interact with colleagues with lengthy face-to-face discussions because 
the regular use of visiting district judges essentially raises the number of rotating 
active judges being used.115 
V. REVISITING THE COMMITTEE'S RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this section I briefly review the Final Report's recommendations for dealing 
with the appellate caseload crisis and the crisis of volume.116 The Committee's Final 
Report made numerous recommendations on a variety of approaches and topics in the 
federal court system, including the reallocation "of business between the state and 
JoRDANA SrMONE BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE CouRTS IN THE TJNITED STATES 36 (1994); Miner, supra note 
58, at 682-83. 
109. JunICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 20 (1995) (quoting 
the FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 109), reprinted in 166 F.R.D 49, 80 (1995). 
110. Todd Collins, Re-Opened for Business? Caseloads, judicial Vacancies, and Backlog in the Federal Circuit 
Courts, 95 JuoICATURE 20 (2011); see 28 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (providing that a federal judge may retire, 
or go take ~senior status," and co~tinue to receive a full salary with continuing participation in a reduced 
number of cases). 
T 11. Collins, supra note 110, at 28-29. 
112. Id.at29. 
113. Id. 
114. See, e.g., Saphire & Solimine, supra note 106; see also MARSH, supra note; 100, at 1. 
115. See Saphire & Solimine, supra note 106, at 376; see also Miner, supra note 58, at 714--15. 
116. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 109. For a thorough review and examination of the Federal Courts 
Study Committee's recommendations, both structural and nonstructural in nature, see Miner, supra 
note 58, at 683-90 (reviewing the major findings and recommendations of the Committee Report 
relating to federal courts of appeals and evaluating them in light of the condition of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit). See id. at 690-98 (reviewing the Committee's recommendations for 
changes in district court procedure); id. at 698-707 (reviewing the Committee's recommendations for 
the "development of innovations for court management"); id. at 707-15 (discussing the decisional 
process)~ id. at 715-24 (reviewing proposed adjustments in federal court jurisdiction that might affect 
the "flow of cases to the courts of appeals"). 
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federal systems," the creation of additional capacity within the federal judicial branch, 
and "concerns about sentencing, federal court administration, and ways to protect 
against bias and discrimination in the judicial branch and the judicial process."117 Of 
the appellate caseload crisis specifically, however, the Committee made, for the most 
part, what can be called structural recommendations for dealing with the crisis.118 
These recommendations, of which the Committee ultimately recommended the 
rejection,119 are premised on what the Final Report describes as the "'five fundamental 
characteristics' of the federal courts of appeals [that] have persisted since their 'creation 
in 1891."'120 The characteristics, which pertain to the traditional "decisional and 
geographic structures" and organization of the courts of appeals, are that the courts of 
appeals "comprise the only intermediate tier of courts in the federal system, provide 
litigants an appeal as of right, assign cases for decision by three-judge panels, are 
organized geographically, and are divided into circuits roughly approximating the 
number of Supreme Court justices."121 
At the outset, it bears noting that the Final Report's proposals did not include an 
increase in the number of federal circuit judges, the Committee having essentially 
reasoned that the appellate caseload crisis could not be "solved by the continuous and 
indefinite expansion of the federal judiciary."122 The Committee further reasoned that 
effective judicial performance was contingent on the federal circuit court judges being 
l 17. John]. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 94 LAW LIBR. 
J. 427, 427 (2002). 
118. FrNAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 111-13, 116-23. 
119. Id. at 117; see id. at 123 (statement ofJ. Cabranes) e[E]choing the committee's call for more study of this 
subject and reiterating that the committee has approved none of the various proposals noted in the text .... "). 
120. Martha Dragich, Back to the Drawing Board: Re-Examining Accepted Premises of Regional Circuit Structure, 
12 J. APP. PRAC. &PuocEss 201, 231 (2011) {quoting Final Report, supra nOte 2, at 113). 
121. Id. (footnotes omitted); see FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 113. I believe that the number of judgeships 
per circuit also goes to the structure and organization of the courts of appeals and is therefore another 
structural characteristic addressed by the Commiti:ee's Final Report. Id. at 111-12. On the other hand, 
contemporary characteristics of the courts of appeals, which have evolved over time, have been said to 
include nonstructural characteristics such as "the rising caseloads of the courts of appeals and the 
processes and procedures [the courts of appeals] employ to deal with expanded caseloads." Dragich, 
supra note 120, at 232. Other contemporary characteristics responsive to the increased appellate caseload 
include increases in the number and use of law clerks and other staff, reductions in oral argument time 
allowed, the increased use of summary dispositions, and the use of settlement programs. FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 114; see also Dragich, supra note 120, at 232 (citing FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 114). 
Another evolving characteristic of the courts of app~als, which is said to have been affected by the 
appellate caseload, is the caseload makeup or types of cases before the circuit courts. See id. at 245 
("Given the marked shift in the federal courts' caseload from diversity to federal question cases, the 
federal courts today far more often apply federal law (whether constitutional, statutory, or 'genuine' 
federal common law) than state law."); see also Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts at the Crossroads, 4 CoNST. 
COMMENT. 251, 253-54 {1987) (noting the direct correlation between (1) Congress's "enthusiasm .. 
for enacting criminal laws" and the general federalization of criminal law and (2) the great vOlume of 
cases added to the federal courts, "giving rise to the geometric progression of [the circuits'] workload"). 
122. Miner, supra note 58, at 682; see also id. at 683-84 (noting that the Committee's Final Report also 
rejected the 1975 proposal by the Hruska Commission, formally known as the Commission on Revision 
of the Federal Court Appellate System, for the establishment of a National Court of Appeals: a 
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"sufficiently few in number to feel a personal stake in the consequences of their 
actions."123 The Committee also noted its concern about maintaining intra- and inter-
court uniformity in federal law, which could become fractured if there were an 
increase in the number of courts or judgeships.124 I have remarked that typically 
neither my colleagues nor other circuit judges exhibit great enthusiasm for the 
expansion of the federal judiciary or for an increase in the number of judges sitting on 
our courts of appeals.125 
Turning to my review of the five structural alternatives proposed by the 
Committee's Final Report, I reiterate that the Committee declined to endorse any of 
these proposals, so I only briefly review them here, although structural revisions and 
adaptations to the courts of appeals have served as cannon fodder to much scholarly 
debate on the topic.126 The first recommendation envisioned multiple circuit courts 
functioning as a unified or nationalized appellate court operating through regional 
divisions and a federal circ\lit division from the U.S. Claims Court and the U.S. 
Court of International Trade.127 The current geographic circuit boundaries would be 
replaced by larger regional boundaries, with the nation evenly divided into regions.128 
Under this approach, nine judges would serve in each of the regional divisions, and 
intercircuit conflicts generated by "the proliferation of panels would be handled in one 
of two ways: a rule could be adopted requiring adherence to precedents established by 
prior panel decisions in other divisions; or a central division of the unified court could 
be established to hear and decide conflicts among regional divisionS."129 It has been 
said that with a central division of representative judges, these judges could "review 
panel decisions and resolve remaining conflicts as a kind of national [in] bane court. 
nationalized appellate court "would not solve the problem of growth within the courts of appeals" and 
"could resolve only a piece of the problem"). 
123. Id. at 682. 
124. See id. at 682-83. 
125. Id. at683. 
126. See, e.g., AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE ABA STANDING CoMMITTEE ON_ FEDERAL JuoICIAL 
IMPROVEMENTS REGARDING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF TIIE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 4 
(1991) (noting the ABA Litigation Section's disagreement with the Final Report's preference for a 
~small" judiciary and recommending that additional judgeships should be created, that existing 
vacancies should be filled promptly, and that "the existing structure of the Federal circuits continue to 
be an appropriate way of deciding appeals"); THOMAS E. BAKER, JusTICE RESEARCH INST., RATIONING 
JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 33-51 (1994) (collecting and 
synthesizing the findings of previous studies examining the appellate caseload crisis and proposed 
adaptations); CoMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTS. FOR THE FED. CouRTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 
59-66 (1998) [hereinafter WHITE COMMISSION REPORT} (opining that ~some changes to the structure 
of the courts of appeals will help them deal with the conundrum they will face as caseloads grow" and 
proposing two~judge panels as one possible chang-e to alleviate increasing appellate caseloads). 
127. Miner, supra note 58, at 685; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 118. 
128. Miner, supra note 58, at 685; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 118. 
129. Miner, supra note 58, at 685; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 118. 
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This would reduce the expectation of more frequent conflicts generated by more 
circuits without relying on the Supreme Court."130 
The Committee's second structural proposal featured a four-tiered federal court 
system, whereby "two appellate courts are interposed between the district courts and 
the Supreme Court."131 "The first appellate tier would consist of twenty to thirty 
regional appellate divisions, with nine or ten judges per division."132 "Appeals of right 
from the district courts within a designated geographical area would come to the 
frrst-tier appellate division covering that region."133 "The second appellate tier would 
consist of four or five tribunals located in various areas of the nation," and "each 
second-tier court would have seven judges and would take cases on a discretionary 
basis from a specified grouping of the first-tier courts.''134 I have stated that one 
advantage of a four-tiered federal court system "is said to lie in the ability of the 
higher tribunal to establish a more coherent body oflaw within a system that allows 
all the courts at both levels to remain small in size."135 Under this proposed model, 
the "Supreme Court would take cases only from the upper-level courts, allowing the 
upper-tier court to view and assess the development of uniformity in the decisions of 
the lower-tier courts."136 This approach would have the "Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit designated as a second-tier court, with appeals taken directly to it 
from the U.S. Claims Court and the U.S. Court of International Trade."137 
Commentators have noted that this model would "absorb the expected large cohorts 
of additional judgeships and ... would be designed to handle the expectation of 
more frequent conflicts."138 
The third structural revision proposed would organize the federal appellate 
courts according to subJect matter, creating national subject-matter courts.139 As we 
know, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is one such circuit court fitted to 
this mold.140 This model called for leaving in place the present geographic courts of 
appeals but proposed a number of subject-matter appellate courts.141 Appeals from 
130. BAKER, supra note 126, at 42. 
131. Miner, supra note 58, at 685; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 119. 
132. Miner, supra note 58, at 685; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 119. 
133. Miner, supra note 58, at 685; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 119. 
134. Miner, supra note 58, at 685; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 119. 
135. Miner, supra note 58, at 685; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 119. 
136. Miner, supra note 58, at 685; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 119. 
137. Miner, supra note 58, at 685-86; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 119. 
138. BAKER, supra note 126, at 42. 
139. See Miner, supra note 58, at 686 (citing S.Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the Federal Circuit, 
and the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search far a Model, 39 AM. U.L. REV. 853 
(1990)) (discussing the pros and cons of using national subject matter based courts to help alleviate the 
problems facing the federal appellate system); see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 119-20. 
140. Plager, supra note 139, at 853. 
141. See Miner, supra note 58, at 686; see also FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 120. 
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the district courts would be taken according to the subject of the case on appeal. 
Under this approach, the existing geographic "courts would be relieved of a substantial 
part of their caseload, and many areas of intercircuit conflict would be eliminated."142 
The fourth structural adaptation called for having all circuit judges act as 
members of a single court assigned to sit at locations primarily near their homes.143 
Under this model, the circuit courts would again be structured as "one centrally 
organized tribunal."144 This model would purportedly have the flexibility to allocate 
judges and resources according to need. "It could establish its own precedents for the 
resolution of conflicts between panels and could experiment with subject-matter 
courts and internal tiers."145 This model, of course, could raise collegiality concerns 
as judges would seldom sit with colleagues living in other locales, and the existing 
rotation of three-judge panels providing for random panel member selection would 
surely suffer. Circuit judges living in more remote regions of the country would 
essentially find themselves sitting on relatively static panels with little to no rotation 
of panel members. This might also affect the consistency of federal law. Nevertheless, 
flexibility and the ability to develop internal mechanisms for resolving conflicts 
remain the hallmarks of this model.146 
The final structural proposal -envisioned consolidation of the existing circuit 
courts into five large or "jumbo" circuits.147 Under this model, judges would be 
assigned to sit in subdivisions of the five jumbo circuits.148 Judges could be assigned 
to sit in the subdivisions, which would be made possible by the '(shifting of resources 
within each jumbo circuit."149 Intracircuit conflicts would be resolved by each jumbo 
circuit in its discretion, and "in bane sittings, with rotating memberships, have been 
suggested as a means of maintaining uniformity in jumbo circuit."150 Because this 
proposal essentially recreates and multiplies the Ninth Circuit, adoption of this 
recommendation would seem unadvisable given the past and current debate 
surrounding proposals to split the Ninth Circuit.151 
Because in my view it cannot be stated that the structural recommendations for 
addressing the appellate caseload crisis have gained any serious momentum (in one 
142. Miner, supra note 58, at 686. 
143. Id.; see FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 119. 
144. Miner, supra note 58, at 686; see FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 119. 
145. Miner, supra note 58, at 686; see FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 119. 
146. BAKER, supra note 126, at 43. 
147. Miner, supra note 58, at 686-87; see FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 122. 
148. Miner, supra note 58, at 686-87; see FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 122. 
149. Miner, supra note 58, at 686-87; see FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 122. 
150. Miner, supra note 58, at 686-87; see FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 122. 
151. See, e.g., Wr-nTE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 126, at 29-57; see also Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Judgeship and Reorganization Act of 2011, H.R. 162, 112th Cong. (2011);- Frank Tamulonis III, 
Splitting the Ninth Circuit: An Administrati'Ue Necessity or Environmental Gerrymandering?, 112 PENN ST. 
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direction or another) in Congress since the Committee issued its Final Report, 152 
scholarship must also continue to examine the inadequacy of the present methods 
and nonstructural solutions, each of which I now turn to. 
VI. ASSESSING THE INADEQUACY OF PRESENT METHODS 
I focus in this section on the availability and efficacy (or lack thereoD of the 
imposition of sanctions, adjudication of an appeal by summary disposition, and the 
acceptance of Anders briefs as tools for managing the caseload crisis. What is apparent 
is that while they may be effective methods by which a court may discourage and 
quickly dispose of frivolous appeals, these methods are completely inadequate in their 
present employ to be used as tools for managing meritless, but not frivolous, appeals. 
A. Sanctions 
An appellate court's power to impose sanctions derives from several independent 
sources: Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,153 28 U.S.C. § 1927,154 
and the inherent authority of the court."5 In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1912 confers 
jurisdiction upon courts of appeals to, in each court's discretion, award single or 
double costs or damages for "delay" to a prevailing party.156 However, the cumbersome 
152. See Miner, supra note 58, at 687 (noting and briefly surveying the "[vJarious criticisms [that] have been 
leveled at each one of the restructuring proposals," which stem from, in part, "a simple reluctance to 
change a system that has worked so well for so long"); see also John Cooper Godbold, Governance of the 
Courts and Structure of the Circuits (doubting that any restructuring ~can occur short of a nationwide 
breakdown in the federal judicial system" and, as a result, "changes in the number and the contours of 
circuits ... will be few and far between"), in FED. JoorcrAL CTR., THE FEDERAi. APPELLATE}UDICIARY 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 32, 35-36 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989). 
153. FED. R. APP. P. 38 ("If a court of appeals determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately 
filed motion or notice from the court and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and 
single or double costs to the appellee."). 
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006) ("Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the 
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorney's 
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct."); see id. § 1912 ("Where a judgment is affirmed by 
the Supreme Court or a court of appeals, the court in its discretion may adjudge to the prevailing party 
just damages for his delay, and single or double costs.")-,see also, e.g., DMA Int'l, Inc. v. Qwest Commc'ns 
Int'l, Inc., 585 F.3d 1341, 1345 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that "[b]ecause arbitration presents such a 
narrow standard of review, Section 1927 sanctions are warranted if the arguments presented are 
completely meritless" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
155. See, e.g., Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 336 (2d Cir. 1999) (discussing court's 
inherent power to sanction); Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing inherent authority 
of the court). 
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (2006) ("Where a judgment is affirmed by the Supreme Court or a court of appeals, 
the court in its d_iscretion may adjudge to the prevailing party just damages for his delay, and single or 
double costs."). This provision often has been applied to sanction frivolous appeals. Kaynard v. MMIC, 
Inc., 734 F.2d 950, 954 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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nature of the procedures established for the imposition of available sanctions, 157 and 
the limited scope of the conduct to which sanctions may attach, discourage their 
regular application.158 
Sanctions against appellants are currently available to discourage appeals that are 
so very meritless as to be deemed "frivolous."159 Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure provides for sanctions consisting of "damages" and single or 
double costs to the appellee upon a judicial determination that an appeal is frivolous.160 
My court has interpreted Rule 38 to permit an award of sanctions only in cases of 
clear frivolity, bad faith, or a multiplicity of filings.161 An appeal has been said to be 
frivolous where it "amount[ed] to 'little more than a continued abuse of process"' and 
was "totally lacking in merit, framed with no relevant supporting law, conclusory in 
nature, and utterly unsupported by the evidence."162 An appeal that "appears to 
represent one more step in an outrageous abuse of civil process through persistent 
pursuit of frivolous and completely meritless claims" also has been characterized as 
frivolous.163 Frivolous appeals have been described as those that rest upon "fanciful 
allegations of fact [or] inarguable assertions of law."164 Clearly, then, all frivolous 
appeals fall within the meritless category, but not all meritless appeals can, at present, 
be sanctioned as frivolous. 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, sanctions may be imposed personally upon an 
attorney who so "multiplies" the proceedings in any case "unreasonably and vexatiously." 
157. See FED. R. APP. P. 38. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 provides: ~If a court of appeals 
determines that an appeal is frivolous, it may, after a separately filed motion or notice from the court 
and reasonable opportunity to respond, award just damages and single or double costs to the appellee." 
While the requirement of notice and an opportunity to respond is, of course, not "cumbersome," the 
courts' narrow definition of "frivolity," as I discuss further below, does constitute a significant obstacle 
in applying sanctions more broadly. See WRIGHT, MILLER, CooPER & STRUVE, supra note 68, § 3984.1 
(explaining the many reasons why a court may decide not to impose sanctions because, even if an 
argument contravenes circuit precedent or its probability of success seems weak, the appeal may still not 
be "frivolous"); see also Robert J. Martineau & Patricia A. Davidson, Fri'Oolous Appeals in the Federal 
Courts: The Ways of the Circuits, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 603, 603 (1985) (assessing the Second, Third, 
Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and the District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals as either 
"uncertain" or "reluctant" when it comes to imposing sanctions for meritless appeals). 
158. In addition, applications for sanctions themselves can give rise to further litigation. Miner, supra note 
121, at 255 (citing Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
159. Formica v. Malone &Assocs., 907 F.2d 397, 400 (2d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted) (~Since we ... do not 
find [the} appeal to be frivolous, we deny [the] motion to dismiss the appeal and to impose appellate 
sanctions."). 
160. FED. R. APP. P. 38. 
161. See, e.g., In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc., 218 F.3d 109, 119-20 (2d Cir. 2000); Moore v. Time, Inc., 
180 F.3d 463, 463-64 (2d Cic. 1999). 
162. United States v. Potamkin Cadillac Corp., 689 F.2d 379, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
163. Chour v. INS, 578 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1987). 
164. United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 
(1989) (describing an appeal as frivolous IT it presents an "indisputably meritless legal theory" or "factual 
contentions [that] are clearly baseless"). 
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These sanctions may include "the excess costs, expenses, and attorney's fees" occasioned 
by such conduct. These sanctions are designed to discourage lawyers from burdening 
the opposing party with unnecessary delays. However, they do not necessarily 
discourage meritless appeals and seem to require the showing of some sort of intentional 
misconduct that is unreasonable and vexatious.165 Nor does the provision apply to 
discourage a meritless appeal by a pro se litigant.166 
Leave-to-file or reporting requirements also may be imposed as a sanction as an 
alternative or addition to costs and damages.167 "[C]ourts may impose sanctions, 
including restrictions on future access to the judicial system," if a litigant "has a 
history of filing 'vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits."'168 Circuit courts 
typically warn a litigant before imposing sanctions that restrict future access to the 
appellate courts. The court may enter an order barring an appellant from making any 
future filings without approval by the court if the court makes a determination that 
the litigant or appellant "abused the judicial process to harass [the opposing party] 
with vexations and frivolous suits."169 
Notwithstanding the availability of sanctions, they have been imposed in too few 
cases to penalize those who pursue frivolous appeals, to compensate those required to 
respond to them, and to discourage those who would unduly burden the appellate 
165. Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) ("[A]lthough Fed. R. App. P. 38 permits the 
award of damages to an appellee in the case of a frivolous appeal, it does not authorize the dismissal of 
a frivolous appeal."); see also Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.Jd 138, 143 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting 
that an award of sanctions must be supported by a finding that a party acted "in bad faith, i.e., motivated 
by improper purposes such as harassment or delay" (internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Hyatt v. 
Metro. Transp. Auth., 370 F. App'x 153, 154 (2d Cir. 2010) (denying a motion for sanctions where the 
appellant's "argument on appeal clearly [wa~J meritless, [but] there [was] no indication that he was 
appealing the district court's judgment in bad faith, or that he has made similar arguments in federal 
courts in the past"); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp. Inc·., 995 F.2d 1138, 1147 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The 
standard for the imposition of [sanctions under Rule 38] is where the appeal taken is found to be 
groundless, without foundation, and without merit, even though appellant did not bring it in bad faith." 
(emphasis added)). 
166. In contrast to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, Rule 38 does not exempt pro se appellants. See Meehan Rasch, Not 
Taking Frivolity Lightly: Circuit Variance in Determining Frivolous Appeals Under Federal Rule ef Appellate 
Procedure 38, 62 ARK. L. REV. 249, 275-78 (2009) (collecting practices of different circults). 
167. Most recently, an appeal arising from a complaint alleging that former senior gove_rnment officials 
caused the September 11, 2001, attacks captured the attention of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 366-68 (2d Cir. 2011). In that case, where the appeal (and the original 
complaint) were "brought without the slightest chance of success," the court, nostre sponte, ordered 
petitioner and her counsel to show cause why they should not pay double costs and damages under Rule 
38, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the inherent power of the court. Id. at 370 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Pursuant to subsequent orders, the court imposed sanctions on two of the appellant's attorneys for filing 
a frivolous appeal and ordered them to pay double costs to the government along with damages in the 
amount of $15,000. Id. The court also imposed a one-year reporting requirement should either attorney 
file any matter in any federal court within the Second Circuit. Id. 
168. Hong Mai Sa v. Doe, 406 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Iwachiw v N.Y. State Dep't of Motor 
Vehicles, 396 F.3d 525, 528 (2d Cir. 2005)). The court first orders the litigant to show cause why a 
leave-to-file sanction order should not be issued. Id. 
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courts. It seems to me that courts, especially my court, too often deny applications 
for sanctions, or issue slap-on-the-hand warnings, 170 due to an oversensitized fear 
that granting such applications would "stifle [] enthusiasm" or "chill [] creativity."171 
Lest I be labeled as a "stifler" of the creativity of the bar, I instead suggest that such 
terms as "enthusiasm" or "creativity" no longer retain their original connotation but 
now include an all-too-often thinly veiled disguise for an argument completely 
lacking in merit. There certainly still is a place for the creativity and enthusiasm that 
characterize legitimate advocacy. As I have suggested previously, a meritless appeal is 
separate and distinct from one that while perhaps not a "home run," has an objectively 
reasonable basis in law and fact or puts forth a logical and well-reasoned argument 
for the extension of existing law or for overturning precedent. 
In the same vein, too many meritless appeals are considered to be nonfrivolous 
and thus, in most cases, nonsanctionable. A sister circuit has opined that "it's pretty 
easy to distinguish a frivolous from a nonfrivolous case."172 I respectfully think that 
this overstates what I believe to be "difficult business."173 Distinguishing a frivolous 
appeal from one "likely without merit" has always proved to be a challenging task for 
me, 174 and I have always thought that more meritless appeals belong in the frivolous 
category than perhaps some of my counterparts. If it were the case that frivolous 
appeals are easily identified, sanctions could serve more effectively as a deterrent for 
not only frivolous but also certain classes of meritless, appeals.175 
B. Summary Dispositions and Anders Briefs 
Motions for summary affirmance and the Tiling of an Anders brief also exist for 
coping with frivolous appeals. An appellee may make a motion for summary 
affirrnance of the judgment of the district court. Such a disposition is a rare exception 
to full merits briefing and is available only upon a judicial determination that an 
170. See, e.g., Vargas v. Wughalter, 380 F. App'x 110, 110 (2d Cir. 2010); Jeffreys v. United Technologies 
Corp., 357 F. App'x 370, 373 (2d Cir. 2009). 
171. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1268 (2d Cir. 1986) (alteration in original); see also United States 
v. Davis, 598 F.3d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 2010) ("We have cautioned the bar that overreaching attempts to 
dismiss appeals as frivolous, like excessively zealous claims that adversary counsel should be sanctioned, 
will not be accorded a friendly reception by this court." (internal quotation marks and alteration 
omitted)); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[W]e do not 
intend to stifle the enthusiasm or chill the creativity that is the very lifeblood of the law."). 
172. United States v. Thouvenot, Wade &Moerschen, Inc., 596 F.3d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J.). 
173. See WSM, Inc. v. Tenn. Sales Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1088 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Frivolity, like obscenity, is 
often difficult to define."). 
174. Love v. McCray, 413 F.3d 192, 194 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
175. Different circuits consider different factors in deciding whether to award Rule 38 sanctions. See Rasch, 
supra note 166, at 273-75. For example, the Third Circuit applies a "reasonable attorney" test, by which 
the court determines whether, "following a thorough analysis of the record and careful research of the 
law, a reasonable attorney would conclude that the appeal is frivolous." Id. (citing Beam v. Bauer, 383 
F.3d 106, 109-10 (3d Cic. 2004)). 
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appeal is truly frivolous.176 Especially in the context of a criminal appeal, an easy case 
for which the outcome "seems obvious" is to be distinguished from a frivolous case 
that is inarguable or fanciful. "More than a fmding that the correct resolution of an 
appeal seems obvious is required."177 
In the criminal context, defense counsel may file a brief pursuant to Anders v. 
California, along with a motion to be relieved as appellate ~ounsel, if he determines 
that no nonfrivolous issues exist on appeal.17g The standard for granting such a 
motion is high; it will be granted only upon a judicial determination that "counsel 
has diligently searched the record for any arguably meritorious issue in support of his 
client's appeal" and that "counsel's declaration that the appeal would be frivolous is, 
in fact, legally correct."179 While both summary dispositions and Anders briefs 
certainly serve a purpose in deterring frivolous appeals, as with sanctions, they do 
not serve adequately to discourage meritless appeals. 
While special circumstances in the criminal context require "easy" cases to be 
distinguished from frivolous ones, it still seems to me that more attorneys, especially 
those appointed as CJA counsel, should be filing Anders briefs and motions to be 
relieved as counsel.180 It is not the rare case where I have seen an attorney travel from 
as far away as Buffalo or Syracuse to argue an appeal that instead should have been 
resolved by filing such a motion. While the requirements are many, rhy court has 
prepared detailed instructions along with an '~nders Checklist" to assist counsel with 
compliance with these requirements. Finally, defense counsel would be wise to bear 
in mind that "the right to appellate representation does not include a right to present 
frivolous arguments to the court ... [and] an attorney is under an ethical obligation 
to refuse to prosecute a frivolous appeal."181 
176. Davis, 598 F.3d at 14. 
177. Id. at 13-14. 
178. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT, How TO FILI<: AN ANDERS BRIEF lN THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR TI-IE SECOND CIRCUIT (2010), available at http://www.ca2.uscourts. 
gov/clerk/Forms_and_instructions/pdf/Anders%20brief%20instructi.ons%20and%20checklist%20 
combined%2010-ll.pdf. See generally Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
179. United States v. Burnett, 989 F.2d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Pi.llay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d 
Cir. 1995) ("In substance, the granting of motions for summary affirmance in Anders cases is not 
significantly distinguishable from dismissal of appeals as frivolous."). 
180. Of note is a circuit split whereby the majority of the circuits, including the Second Circuit, require 
defense counsel to file an appeal upon a defendant's request, notwithstanding any plea bargain into 
which the defendant entered. The Seventh Circuit, in contrast, has held that a plea bargain relieyes 
counsel of any duty to file an appeal. See generally Tamar Kaplan-Marans, An Appealing Split: Filing an 
Appeal After a Plea Bargain: Is Counsel Obliged to File a MeritlessAppeal?, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1183, 1183-
85 (2009) (citing Nunez v. United States, 546 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2008); Campusano v. United States, 
442 F.3d 770, 777 (2d Cic. 2006)). 
181. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 272 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnston v. 
Maha, 606 F.3d 39, 41 (2010) ("[A]sk[ing] first whether the claimant has met 'a threshold showing of 
some likelihood of merit.'" (quoting Cooper v. A Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170 (1989))). 
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VII. ADVANCING A PROPOSAL 
As the title of this article indicates, my intent has been to revisit the 1990 Report 
of the Federal Courts Study Committee to illustrate that the problems identified by 
the Committee in 1990 continue to remain at the forefront today. In that light, as 
part of this revisit I also "readvance" an idea that was proposed but ultimately rejected 
by the Committee in 1990. In its Final Report, the Committee recommended that 
Congress reject adoption of a "loser pays" rule or, as also commonly known, the 
"English Rule.'"" In doing ~o, it opined: 
Although sometimes advocated, a general rule making losing parties fully 
liable for the winners' reasonable attorney fees is a radical measure that would 
be· inconsistent with traditional American attitudes toward access to courts. 
Such a rule would work harshly in close cases, especially when a party 
advocates a position that is reasonable but is nevertheless unsuccessful. It 
might excessively discourage parties with plausible but not clearly winning 
claims, particularly when a prospective party is risk averse~as is likely to be 
true of middle-class persons who cannot risk a big loss. Furthermore, the rule 
could actually make settlement less likely: other things being equal, it 
increases the negotiation gap between the litigants. Even jurisdictions like 
the United Kingdom that formally follow the loser-pays rule often temper it 
substantially, as by imposing only partial liability, providing broad public 
legal aid, or making the rule inapplicable in significant classes of cases.183 
While rejecting recommendation of the "loser pays" rule, the Committee nonetheless 
noted its support for attorney fee shifting in certain circumstances, such as "discovery 
motions and in business litigation between well-financed adversaries."184 Interestingly 
enough, these "certain circumstances" now include over 200 federal statutes ·and 
2000 state statutes that provide for some type of fee shifting-"5 
In the years since the Committee's rejection of this proposal, much has been 
written by both the proponents and opponents of the English Rule, but little has 
been done.186 I myself have long advocated a departure from the American Rule187 
182- Under the English Rule, the successful party (upon the discretion of the court) may recover attorneys' 
fees and expenses from the losing party. Civil Procedure Rules, 1998, S.I. 3132(L.17), r. 44.3(1)-(2) 
(U.K.); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). 
183. FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 105. 
184. Id. The American Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements echoed the 
recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee that adoption of the English Rule be rejected. 
See AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 126, at 5. 
185. John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to justice, 42 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1567, 1588-89 (1993); see Civil Rights Att~rney Fee Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006). 
186. See, e.g., Brandon Chad Bungard, Fee! Fief Foe.' Fum!: I Smell the Efficiency of the English Rule Finding the 
Right Approach to Tort Reform, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 1, 37 (2006) (presenting an "economic 
theoretical analysis of fee shifting"); Vargo, supra note 185, at 1626. 
187. Under the American Rule, each litigant bears his own costs, and "'the prevailing litigant is ordinarily 
not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser."' Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. 
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 448 (2007) (quoting Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. at 270-71). An 
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regarding attorneys' fees in favor of the English Rule.188 In addition to better serving 
the interests of fundamental fairness, I believe that adoption of such a rule would 
better serve to deter frivolous and meritless appeals (and actions filed in the district 
courts).189 As I previously have written, I continue to advocate a meaningful shift 
toward (or at least an experiment with) the English Rule.190 
Because I believe that a key benefit of the English Rule is that it better fulfills 
fundamental fairness, it is essential that judges be afforded the discretion-as is 
generally the case with the current fee-shifting statutes-ultimately to make an 
award.191 Judges are well-suited to making these types of determinations. A prime 
example is in the case of litigation arising under the Copyright Act, which provides 
that a "court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any 
party other than the United States or an officer thereof"192 Pursuant to the Supreme 
Court's directive, the lower courts are guided by the "Fogerty factors" as they exercise 
their equitable discretion in such cases.193 These nonexclusive "Fogerty factors" 
include: "frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual 
and in the legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to 
advance considerations of compensation and deterrence."194 In evaluating these 
factors, the courts are instructed to remain "faithful to the purposes of the Copyright 
Act."195 It seems to me that the same must remain in an "English Rule world." Courts 
must remain faithful to a litigant's right of access to the courts while balancing the 
considerations embodied in the Fogerty factors. 196 
exception arises in the case of a specific statutory fee-shifting provision and a contract allocating fees. 
Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205, 2213 (2011). 
188. The Supreme Court has opined on several occasions that the American Rule is "firmly entrenched" as a 
"bedrock principle" in American Society. See Fox, 131 S. Ct. at 2213; Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life 
Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2156-57 (2010). While it might be the well-established rule in this country, I 
believe that, if put to a vote, the American people overwhelmingly would support adoption of the 
English Rule. See Miner, supra note 121, at 257. 
189. Miner, supra note 121, at 257. 
190. Roger J. Miner, Research in judicial Administration: A judge's Perspective, 12 JusT. Svs. J. 8, 14-15 (1987). 
191. Such is not the case in all "loser pays" jurisdictions. The law in Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands, 
for example, does not permit the courts such discretion. Bungard, supra note 186, at 35-36. 
192. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). 
193. Fogertyv. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994). 
194. Id. at 534 & n.19. 
195. Id. 
196. A second example where judges are afforded discretion in determining whether to award fees is the 
Equal Access to Justice Act, which permits an award of fees and costs to certain classes of "prevailing 
part[ies]" where the position taken by the government was not "substantially justified." 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2412(d)(l)(A) (2006). These cases lie "[b]etween frivolous and meritorious" cases, and are "justified to 
a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person and hence ha[veJ a 'reasonable basis both in law and fact."' 
United States v. Thouvenot, Wade &Moerschen, Inc., 596 F.3d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 2010) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). "The case must have sufficient merit 
to negate an inference that the government was coming down on its small opponent in a careless and 
oppressive fashion." Id. at 381-82. 
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While implementation of the English Rule may help to quell the tide of meritless 
civil appeals, I concede that it would be a less effective tool for managing the crisis of 
volume regarding criminal appeals. An overarching concern is that, unlike a party 
wishing to appeal a civil judgment, in our legal system, a criminal defendant is 
afforded with a general statutory (but not constitutional) right to an appeal.197 
Therefore, any deterrent (such as a shift in fees) must not unreasonably discourage a 
criminal defendant from filing a legitimate appeal.198 However, notwithstanding this 
right, legislatures cannot have intended to afford defendants with an unfettered right 
to burden the federal courts with appeals containing solely "loser" arguments. 
Therefore, I believe that meritless criminal appeals can and should be discouraged by 
affirmative measures. 
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)199 was one such affirmative measure 
taken by Congress to dissuade and discourage frivolous litigation and appeals,200 but 
I believe that the PLRA simply does not go far enough to effectively deter frivolous 
appeals.201 To this end, the PLRA, for example,202 should be amended to impose an 
197. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977); see also Pennsylvania v. 
Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) ("We think that since a defendant has no federal constitutional right to 
counsel when pursuing a discretionary appeal on direct review of his conviction, a fortiori, he has no 
such right when attacking a conviction that has long since become final upon exhaustion of the appellate 
process."). 
198. Cf United States v. Rosa, 123 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[A]ny plea agreement which contains a 
waiver of an important right, such as the right to appeal, poses theoretical concerns."). 
199. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
200. See Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Congress, in recent amendments to the in 
forma pauperis statute, aimed to reduce the volume of meritless litigation flooding federal courts by making 
payment of filing fees mandatory. [The PLRA] also provides a mandatory mechanism for collecting costs 
when assessed by courts against prisoners who are made to pay the consequences should they lose."). 
201. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2006) (requiring that an inmate pay court filing fees in full and providing that 
an inmate may pay the fee over time with monthly installments); 29 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2006) (setting 
forth what is commonly known as the "three-strikes provision"); 28 U.S.C. § 1932 (2006) (providing 
that a "court may order the revocation of such earned good time credit ... that has not yet vested, if, on 
its own motion or the motion of any party, the court finds that---(1) the claim was filed for a malicious 
purpose; (2) the claim was filed solely to harass the party against which it was filed; or (3) the claimant 
testifies falsely or otherwise knowingly presents false evidence or information to the court"); see also 
Feliciano v. Selsky, 205 F.3d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 2000) (Miner, J.) (holding that under the PLRA ~courts 
continue to have the authority to assess costs against an indigent prisoner," but noting that, because the 
PLRA added a provision to the in forma pauperis statute requiring payment for costs in the same manner 
as the payment of the filing fee, an indigent prisoner may be required to pay "full costs [only] in the 
event that the judgment requires it"); Barbara Bdbot, Report on the Prison Litigation Reform Act: What 
Have the Courts Decided So Far?, 84 PRISON]. 290, 300-03 (2004) (surveying federal cases that have 
rejected constitutional objections to the PLRA's three-strikes provision that "preclude[s] a prisoner from 
proceeding IFP if he or she, while incarcerated or detained, has on three or more occasions brought an 
action or appeal that was dismissed on the grounds that it was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted"). 
202. An amendment could also be made to 18 U.S.C. § 3013 (2006), which provides for special assessments 
on convicted persons, to provide courts with the authority to impose an additional assessment.on a 
criminal-defendant liti~nt if that individual's appeal was determined to be frivolous. 
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assessment if a criminal defendant's appeal were found to be frivolous. 203 However, 
because many criminal defendants pursuing an appeal are either indigent or serving 
lengthy sentences and therefore less likely to be deterred by the threat of a monetary 
assessment, any amendment to the PLRA, for example, should include a provision 
expressly providing for payment of an assessment from the inmate's commissary 
account. 204 
Regardless of whether Congress amends the PLRA to expressly provide for 
monetary sanctions imposed on an inmate's prison account or commissary for pursuing 
frivolous litigation,205 there are provisions in place within the correctional systems-
federal and state-to support such a practice. In the federal correctional system, 
correctional facilities are run and managed by the United States Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The BOP issues Program Statements on policies and 
203. Mallory Yontz, Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act: Imposing Financial Burdens on Prisoners over 
Tax Payers, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1061, 1079-80 (2011) ("If a financial burden is placed on prisoners 
who bring frivolous suits by way of an amendment to the PLRA, their zeal for filing will likely be 
reduced to only those suits that boast legitimate claims. It is proposed that if a prisoner files a frivolous 
suit, he or she should be subject to a monetary penalty in the form of a deduction of a set percentage of 
his prison account balance."). 
204. See 28 C.F.R. § 506.1 (2012) ("The purpose of individual inmate commissary accounts is to allow the 
Bureau to maintain irunates' monies while they are incarct;rated."); if. 28 C.F.R. § 506.2 (2012) (explaining 
how deposits to an inmate's commissary account are made to a "centralized inmate commissary account"); 
Inmate Commissary Account Deposit Procedures, 69 Fed. Reg. 40,315, 40,315-17 Uuly 2, 2004) (to be 
codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 506, 540) (adding new regulations pertaining to inmate deposits to a centralized 
inmate commissary account designed to "provide for the more efficient processing of inmate funds"); Inmate 
Commissary Account Deposit Procedures, 64 Fed. Reg. 20,126, 20,126 (April 23, 1999) {to be codified at 
28 C.F.R. pts. 506, 540); Yontz, supra note 203, at 1080 {"When a person becomes a prisoner, a personal 
account may be set up in his name to manage money he earns and spends while in prison. These accounts, 
referred to as commissary[, inmate, prison,] or canteen accounts ... can be used to purchase a variety of 
items from the commissary including toothpaste or even candy bars, but money is also deducted from the 
account if the prisoner has any legal depend[e]nts." (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)). If a prisoner 
"does not have enough money in the account to cover such costs, funds may nevertheless be deducted from 
the account, in some cases leaving it with a negative balance." Id. Because some state correctional facilities 
will recoup negative balances, '"[i]f funds become available or if the prisoner reenters the jail at a later date,"' 
prisoners do indeed "have an incentive to maintain a positive balance in their accounts so that they may 
purchase desired items while incarcerated, and also because they are paid the balance upon their release." Id. 
(citing 0KJ •• STAT. ANN. 57 § 549 (2012)). 
205. An alternative to monetary sanctions imposed for pursuing frivolous litigation is 28 U.S.C. § 1932 
(2006) (another PLRA provision), which provides that: 
[A] court may order the revocation of such earned good time credit ... that has not yet 
vested, if, on its own motion or the motion of any party, the court finds that-(1) the 
claim was filed for a malicious purpose; (2) the claim was filed solely to harass the party 
against which it was filed; or (3) the claimant testifies falsely or otherwise knowingly 
presents false evidence or information to the court. 
28 U.S.C. § 1932 (2006) (alteration in original). See generally Tubwell v. Anderson, 776 So.2d 654 
(Miss. 2000) (holding that where a condition-of-confinement lawsuit is considered by the state or 
federal court and dismissed as frivolous, the statute providing for forfeiture of good-time credits passes 
constitutional muster). 
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management of the federal prisons.206 One of these Program Statements is the Trust 
Fund/Deposit Fund Manual, which pertains to an inmate's commissary account.207 The 
Trust Fund/Deposit Fund Manual expressly provides that an inmate's consent is not 
required for withdrawal of funds from an inmate's commissary account when compliance 
with a federal court order is required.208 In fact, the BOP's Trust Fund/Deposit Fund 
Manual also states that "Federal Court Orders requiring disbursement of funds from an 
inmate account must be followed. The court order serves as the source document for the 
withdrawal."209 It likely would not be disputed that an inmate greatly values his or her 
commissary account and the funds in that account since many items deemed essential or 
basic to living by individuals not incarcerated are available only for purchase in prison 
using funds from an inmate's commissary account. 210 It also likely cannot be disputed 
that an inmate contemplating the pursuit of a frivolous appeal would be deterred from 
doing so if he or she was aware that the federal court could impose monetary sanctions 
payable from the prisoner's commissary account.211 Because federal BOP "[i]nmates are 
not limited- in the amount that may be maintained in their inmate account," federal 
courts could set the monetary sanctions at whatever amount it deems necessary to deter 
the inmate from pursuing frivolous appeals."212 
206. See Policy Documents (Called Program Statements at the BOP), FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF 
JuSTICE, http://www.bop.gov/DataSource/execute/dsFormLoc. 
207. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF }uSTICE, PROGRAM STATEMENT P4500.08, TRUST FUND/ 
DEPOSIT MANUAL (2012), available at http://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/4500_008.pdf. 
208. See id. at 86 ("The requirement for prior inmate consent includes withdrawals for committed fines, 
attachments, liens, or any other legal process for the satisfaction of claims. Exceptions are the IRS Tax 
Liens ... and Federal court orders .... "). 
209. Id. at 96. 
210. See Yontz, supra note 203, at 1079 ("If you do not want someone to do something, chances are hitting 
him where it hurts-his pocket book-will likely prove to be an effective deterrent. At the very least, a 
financial burden will induce consideration before action. It is precisely this contemplation of human 
behavior, as it corresponds to personal economics, which is the foundation for the solution to excessive 
frivolous prison litigation."); see also FEo. Juo1C1AL CTR., RESOURCE GUIDE FOR MANAGING PRISONER 
CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM AcT 52 
(1996) ("Although the majority of pro se litigants ... have few assets that would make an award of 
monetary sanctions worthwhile to their opponents, such sanctiOns can still be an appropriate way to try 
to modify abusive litigants' behavior. Like a partial filing fee, monetary sanctions can make it less likely 
that a prisoner will pursue worthless claims or engage in truly abusive litigation. However, the prisoner's 
ability to pay must be considered in determining the sanction." (citing Mil tier v. Downes, 935 F.2d 660 
(4th Cir. 1991))); Dodd Ins. Serv., Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 935 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1991); In re 
Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 524 (4th Cir. 1990). 
211. See Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.Jd 264, 278 (2d Cir. 2001) ("With two separate ceilings, a prisoner has a 
relatively strong incentive to drop a frivolous lawsuit after he has filed the suit because, immediately after 
an adverse judgment, he could have to pay an additional 20 percent ofhis monthly income for costs arising 
from the suit. With one ceiling, a prisoner would have less incentive to drop a frivolous lawsuit because, no 
matter what costs are ultimately imposed on him, only 20 percent of his monthly income would be subject 
to recoupment-an amount already exposed to recoupment for filing fees." (citation omitted)). 
212. Inmate Commissary Account Deposit Procedures, 69 Fed. Reg. 40,315, 40,315 Guly 2, 2004) (to be 
codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 506, 540) (citing FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP1T OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM 
STATEMENT 2000.02 AccoUNTING MANAGEMENT MANUAL (1986)). Although the BOP has established 
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Several states also have statutory or institutional provisions in place to allow-or 
at the least that do not prohibit~their state courts to effectively deter frivolous 
litigation through the use of, inter alia, monetary sanctions deductible from an inmate's 
commissary. Such express authority obviously goes beyond the current PLRA 
provisions allowing for the taxing of costs and filing fees. For example, in my home 
state of New York, the regulations provide that a state court may, "in addition to or in 
lieu of awarding costs ... impose fmancial sanctions upon any party or attorney in a 
civil action or proceeding who engages in frivolous conduct."213 As to the correctional 
institutions' policies in New York, the correctional facilities in New York State are run 
and managed by the New York State Department of Corrections and Community 
Supervision (DOCCS), which 
is responsible for the confinement and habilitati.on of approximately 56,000 
[inmates] held at 60 state facilities. 214 In its handbook made available to 
inmates and their families, DOCCS states that "often there are court 
surcharges, fees, or other encumbrances that inmates may have that are 
unpaid. Monies coming in from the outside will be applied to those 
outstanding obligations. Other than the inmate's incentive wage, funds may 
not be available for commissary [purchases] and other items until these 
obligations are satisfied."215 
Although the foregoing does not expressly state that sanctions may be levied on an 
inmate's account, the handbook's provision clearly puts the inmates on notice that 
their inmate accounts are subject to "court surcharges, fees, or other encumbrances," 
which obviously may include monetary sanctions imposed by a court. 216 Moreover, 
despite the lack of specific federal or New York State regulations providing courts 
a monthly spending limitation on an inmate's commissary account "to eliminate the disparity between 
affiuent inmates and inmates wl.th few resources," this should not affect the payment of a court-ordered 
sanction because such payment would neither constitute "spending" by the inmate nor coi:iflict with the 
underlying purpose of the spending limitation-to wit, eliminating disparity between inmates. See FED. 
BuREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 207; see a/so id. (increasing the spending 
limitation by $50 "during the November/December holiday period"). 
213. N.Y. COMP. CoDES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 130-1.1 (2012); see also id. § 130-1.l(c) {defining· frivolous 
conduct). See generally N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 116 {McKinney 2011) {"Inmates' Funds"); Id. § 187 
{"Earnings of [I]nmates"). 
214. About DOCCS, N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF CORR. AND CMTY. SUPERVISION, httpJ/www.doccs.ny.gov/ (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2012). 
215. BRIAN FISCHER, N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF CORR. SERVS., HANDBOOK FOR THE FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF 
NEW YoRK STATE DOCS INMATES 18 (2007) (alteration in original). 
216. Jd., cf STATE OF N.Y. DEP'T OF CORR. SERVS., COLLECTION & REPAYMENT OF INMATE ADVANCES & 
OBLIGATIONS (DIRECTIVE# 2788) 8-11 (2009) (discussing only encumbrances on an inmate's account 
resulting from required filing-fee and cost payments under the PLRA and CPLR and remaining silent 
on procedures for the payment of other types of encumbrances from an inmate's account such as 
monetary sanctions imposed by a state or federal court). But see id. at 1 (setting forth "[e]xamples of 
financial obligations which [inmates] may incur," which include those derived from "[c]ourt order[s]" 
{alteration in original)). 
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with express authority to impose sanctions on an inmate's commissary, federal 217 and 
state218 case law appear to support the practice. And several other states have enacted 
statutory provisions expressly allowing for sanctions to be deducted from prisoners' 
accounts.219 
In addition to affirmative measures to deter the filing of frivolous and meritless 
criminal appeals, courts can do more internally to manage their calendars. I previously 
have argued that sentencing-only appeals should be directed to a non-argument 
panel. 220 Although my court adopted this procedure for a short period of time during 
the post-Booker221 years, sentencing-only criminal appeals are no longer routed to the 
Second Circuit's Non-Argument Calendar (NAC), since it was determined that such 
an approach is no longer necessary given the reduction in backlog. This was a 
mistake. In the dozens of sentencing-only criminal appeals that I see each term, 
most of the appeals are meritless, with each appeal generally amounting to court-
appointed counsel applying varying sets of facts to well-settled law.222 Such appeals 
are better placed on the NAC, where specially trained staff attorneys could (as the 
immigration staff attorneys currently do) prepare ben~h memoranda and proposed 
217. See Lay v. Anderson, 837 F.2d 231, 232 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiarn) (taxing costs to the prisoner-
appellant and holding that those "costs are payable from his prison account or any other source of assets 
or income he may have"); see also Hickson v. Crawford, 832 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1987) (Table) (assessing 
costs to be paid from prisoner's trust fund); cf. Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 278 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(concluding that "the in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, permits the recouprnent of filing fees 
and costs at a total rate of 40 percent of a prisoner's monthly income-20 percent for fees and 20 percent 
for costs"). But see Tucker v. Branker, 142 F.3d 1294, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that § 1915 "never 
exacts more than 20% of an indigent prisoner's assets or income."). See Neil H. Cogan, The Inherent 
Power and Due Process Models in Conflict: Sanctiom in the Fifth Circuit, 42 Sw. L.J. 1011, 1019-20 (1989) 
(noting the "development by the court of new remedies against unwanted litigants," including orders 
requiring prison officials to "withdraw moneys from prisoners' trust accounts"); see also id. at app. 
(listing unpublished Fifth Circuit cases,where monetary sanctions were imposed). 
218. See, e.g., Encarnacion v. Goord, 824 N.Y.S.2d 492, 493 (3d Dep't 2006); Nardi v. E.S. Le Fevre, 652 
N.Y.S.2d 133, 133-34 (3d Dep't 1997); Allah.v. Coughlin, 599 N.Y.S.2d 651, 653 & n.1 (3d Dep't 
1993); see also Faison v. State, 673 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854 (Ct. CL 1998). 
219. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-211(£) (2011) ("If the court imposes monetary sanctions on an inmate in 
the custody of the secretary of corrections, the secretary is hereby authorized to disburse any money in 
the inmate's account to pay the sanctions."); OHIO REV. ConE ANN. § 5120.011 (Lexis Nexis 2012) 
(providing that an inmate is subject to one or more of several delineated sanctions-including the loss of 
commissary privileges, and extra work without pay, for 60 days--if a court determines that the inmate's 
action or appeal is frivolous); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2011(B)-(D) (2012) (authorizing, inter alia, the 
confiscation an inmate's "nonmandatory trust funds" in the event a court imposes sanctions arising out of 
frivolous litigation); see also Lowe v. Cantrell, 1 P.3d 438 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999) (quoting and citing with 
approval§ 2011(B)-(D)); OKLA. DEP'T OF CORR., OFFENDER ORIENTATION MANUAL 20 (2012) ("Fines, 
attorney fees and costs ordered as a sanction on an offender for filing a frivolous or malicious lawsuit will 
be paid out of any funds received to be deposited in an offender's trust account until the debt is paid."). 
220. Miner, supra note 58, at 702-03. 
221. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
222. See, e.g., United States v. Carranza-Salcedo, 377 F. App'x 36 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Berganza, 
371 F. App'x 133 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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dispositions. 223 Under the current model, a significant amount of time in my 
chambers is devoted to reviewing the briefs, preparing sitting notes and bench 
memoranda, and reviewing (and sometimes drafting), in most cases, summary 
orders. Time also is allocated to oral argument, where requested. 224 This is a waste of 
judicial resources and of time-a scarce resource that is better spent allocated 
between calendared appeals that pose (hopefully!) meritorious arguments. 225 
In this same vein, for decades, I have advocated that, notwithstanding my court's 
"long tradition" of affording oral argument to nearly all who wish it, a screening 
system be employed to ferret out those easily resolvable cases where oral argument 
would not be beneficial. 226 I continue to advocate that the Second Circuit better 
utilize our specialized staff attorneys to accomplish this screening process, as I have 
recommended that they do with sentencing-only appeals. As is already the case, 
these staff attorneys prescreen cases for jurisdictional issues and then identify, for 
scheduling purposes, the issues raised by the briefs. The staff attorneys then assign a 
ranking to the case, from easy to medium or hard. These rankings are then used in 
organizing the calendar and providing each panel with a diversified caseload. Because 
the staff attorneys are already engaged in this process, court resources would be 
better served by permitting these attorneys to flag "easy" cases that do not identify 
any meritorious arguments and to direct them to the NAC.227 As is our established 
procedure for the NAC, any judge on the non-argument panel could refer any case to 
the Regular Argument Calendar for full argument. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Over twenty years have passed since the Committee first recognized the appellate 
caseload crisis in its "[u]nprecedented study of [the] federal courts."228 The "crisis of 
volume" has not lessened, and yet Congress has failed to act effectively in responding 
223. Miner, supra note 58, at 702-03. 
224_ Sentencing-only appeals are proposed as submitted cases, but a party may request oral argument time. 
225. See Miner, supra note 121, at 258 (discussing the proposal that oral argument be eliminated in such cases 
where "the proper disposition of a case is apparent at a glance at the briefs"); see also Ao MIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL }UDICIARY 4 (2010), available at http://www. 
uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Publications/StrategicPlan2010.pdf ("Exemplary and independent 
judges, ... well-reasoned and researched rulings, and time for deliberation and attention to individual 
issues are among the hallmarks of federal court litigation."); ]. Clifford Wallace, Improving the Appellate 
Process Worldwide Through Maximizing judicial Resources, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 187, 200 (2005). 
226. Miner, supra note 58, at 702-03. 
227. Case management practices vary widely among the circuits. In the First Circuit, for example, senior 
staff attorneys make recommendations about whether appeals should be placed on the regular argument 
calendar, with certain types of cases, such as pro se, bail appeals, social security appeals, Anders brief 
cases, and cases from the BIA tending not to receive oral argument. Levy, supra note 95, at 336. In the 
Fourth Circuit, the default rule is that prose cases are to be resolved without argument. Similarly, social 
security, immigration, and Anders brief appeals "almost always are slated for decision without argument." 
Id. at 338. . 
228. News Release, Federal Courts Study Committee, at 1 (April 2, 1990) (on file with the New York Law 
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to the "major structural or procedural options" identified in the Final Report. 229 I have 
discussed the consequences resulting from this Congressional failure, and I have 
advanced several proposals in this article for dealing with the appellate caseload crisis. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, courts like my own have "developed effective 
responses to [their] mounting caseloads."230 And today, my court continues to 
"function in a satisfactory manner, both in the quality of its work and in the speed 
with which its-decisions are rendered."231 This is due to "[a] combination of custom-
tailored procedures, unique practices, revered traditions, and continued fine-tuning 
of the decision processes and management techniques."232 These judicially crafted 
approaches include, for example, temporary increases in the number of cases 
scheduled on each day's Regular Argument Calendar; the use of a morning ("A 
Panel") and afternoon panel ("B Panel") to hear twice as many cases on a given day; 
the increased use of senior and visiting judges;233 the creation of the Non-Argument 
Calendar to more effectively dispose of the thousands of asylum cases that my court 
has received petitions for review in over the past several years;234 the use of our unique 
"mini en bane" procedure;235 and an increased reliance on staff attorneys and law 
clerks. 236 "The general public and practicing bar obviously have a tremendous interest 
in these policies" and in my court's responses to the appellate caseload crisis, and it is 
my hope that researchers in various disciplines will continue to "contribute their 
talents" to the "enterprise of judicial administration."237 To this end I have donated 
my papers to the Mendik Law Library at New York Law School to "establish a 
229. See Miner, supra note 58, at 729-30 ("Despite many proposals for adjustments of various kinds made 
over the years, the customary congressional response has been to add more judges. The federal court 
system cannot be effective in the performance of the work expected of it if it becomes merely a duplicate 
of the state court system."). 
230. Id. at 730. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. See, e.g., Wilfred Feinberg, Senior Judges: A National Resource, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 409, 410 (1990) ("[T]he 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals simply would not have been able to function as it has over the last two 
decades without the assistance of its seniors."). 
234. See Jon O. Newman, The Second Circuit's Expedited Adjudication of Asylum Cases: A Case Study of a judicial 
Response to an Unprecedented Problem of Caseload Management, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 429, 432-34 (2009). 
235. See The Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi Overseas PTE, Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 60-61 (2d Cir. 2009); see 
also Feinberg, supra note 86;Jon 0. Newman, Foreword: In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit: The Virtues 
of Restraint, 50 BROOK. L. REv. 365, 381-82 (1984) e[O]n infrequent occasion, a proposed panel 
opinion is circulated when the panel members deem it especially appropriate for all members of the 
court to have an opportunity to see and comment on it prior to issuance. This has occurred twelve times 
in the past five years in the Second Circuit. The fact of prior circulation was not always noted in the 
opinion."). See generally FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL, SECOND CIRCUIT COURTS COMMITTEE, EN BANC 
PRACTICES IN THE SECOND C1Rcu1-r: TrME FOR A CHANGE? 15-20 (2011), available at http://www. 
federalbarcouncil.org/vg/custom/uploads/pdfs/En_Banc_Report.pd( 
236. Roger J. Miner, Book Review, 46 CATH. U.L. REV. 1189, 1192 {1997) {reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, 
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM (1996)). 
237. Miner, supra note 190, at 15-16. 
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research collection consisting of archival records relating to [my] career for the use 
and benefit of the students and faculty of New York Law School, other legal scholars, 
historians, political scientists, journalists[,] and researchers of all disciplines."238 
For over twenty-five years, I have discussed the problems of caseload management 
facing the federal judiciary. 239 In addition to professional and legislative responses, I 
have advocated here for judicial responses to the appellate caseload crisis that I hope 
will be considered by my colleagues and court families, to whom I now entrust these 
matters. 
238. New York Law School, Mendik Law Library, The Archival Collection of Judge Roger]. Miner: 1981-1993. 
My Archival Collection is a compilation of materials associated with my tenure as a U.S. District Judge 
for the Northern District of New York and as a U.S. Circuit Judge with the Second Circuit. In addition 
to my district court papers, the compilation totals approximately 250 boxes containing over 120 
unpublished and published speeches and writings; over 4100 case files from the Second Circuit; video 
and audio recordings; and numerous other files relating to my tenure as a Second Circuit Judge. 
239. See generally Roger]. Miner, Professional Responsibility in Appellate Practice: A View From the Bench, 19 
PACE L. REV. 323 (1999); Miner, supra note 236; Roger]. Miner, The Reception of Foreign Law in the 
US. Federal Courts, 42 AM. J CoMP. L. No. 4 (1995); Miner, Identifying, Protecting and Preserving 
Individual Rights: Traditional Federal Court Functions, supra note 27; Roger]. Miner, Federal Court 
Reform Should Start at the Top, 77 Juo1cATURE 104 (1993); Roger J. Miner, Advice and Consent in Theory 
and Practice, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1075 (1992); Miner, supra note 30; Miner, supra note 58; Roger J. Miner, 
Consequences ef Federalizing Criminal Law: Overloaded Courts and a Dissatiified Public, 4 CRIM. JusT. 16 
(1989); Roger J. Miner, Tensions ef a Dual Court System and Some Prescriptions far Relief, 51 ALB. L. REV. 
151 (1987); Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crimes and Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoLY 
117 (1987); Roger J. Miner, supra note 121; Miner, supra note 190. 
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